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Identity Federalism in Europe 







  The turn to identity is reshaping federalism. Opposition to 
the policies of the Trump administration, from the travel ban to 
sanctuary cities and the rollback of environmental protections, 
has led progressives to explore more fluid and contingent forms 
of state identity. Conservatives too have sought to shift federalism 
away from the jurisdictional focus on limited and enumerated 
powers and have argued for a revival of the political safeguards 
of federalism, including state-based identities. This Article draws 
on comparative law to study identity as a political safeguard of 
federalism and its transformation from constitutional discourse 
to interpretative processes and, eventually, constitutional 
doctrine. 
  The experience of the European Union, where identity 
federalism also benefits from a textual anchor, reveals some of the 
complexities of this process. As an eminently vague concept, 
identity leaves too much room for judicial discretion and leads to 
unsolvable conflicts among courts as well as between courts and 
other branches. Like the old sovereignty-based approaches, 
identity encourages judges to draw bright lines, resurrects 
jurisdictional conflicts, and discourages cooperation and 
compromise. In the age of populism, identity federalism draws 
courts into new and particularly concerning forms of 
polarization.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 A specter is haunting federalism—the specter of identity. 
Opposition to the policies of the Trump administration, from the travel 
ban to sanctuary cities to the rollback of environmental protections, 
has led progressives to rediscover the emancipatory virtues of 
federalism and emboldened them to explore “more fluid and contingent 
forms of state identity.”1 The left’s constitutional agenda overlaps with 
the conservative strategy to shift away from a focus on jurisdictional 
matters, seen as having failed to adequately protect state sovereignty,2 
and toward a revival of the political safeguards of federalism—
 
1. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1114 
(2014) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism]. Bulman-Pozen also notes that 
she does not “attempt to defend a notion of state identity as such but instead argues that 
we may be missing a powerful form of identification with states because our 
understanding of what constitutes political identity is too rigid.” Id. at 1108–19.  
2. Ernest A. Young, What Can Europe Tell Us About the Future of American 
Federalism?, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1113–16 (2017) [hereinafter Young, What Can 
Europe Tell Us] (questioning the effectiveness of a strategy centered on the federal 
center’s “limited and enumerated powers”). See also Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member 
State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American 
Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1645–49 (2002). 
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including, importantly, state-based identities.3 While dismissing the 
idea that states have an identity as “pointless, indeed often silly”4 had 
been a common trope during the rise “and rise”5 of the administrative 
state in the twentieth century, today’s political climate and 
constitutional challenges indicate that, as Ernest Young has argued, 
“reports of the death of state identity are greatly exaggerated.”6  
  The identity turn explains, at least in part, why some American 
scholars have found that “the most interesting developments in 
federalism are happening in Europe” and have looked for “European 
structures and solutions [that] may offer some options that Americans 
have previously failed to consider or appreciate.”7 Over the past 
decade, the European Union (EU) has upgraded its protections of 
national constitutional identity,8 and its member states have started 
operationalizing their own similar protections. In particular, both 
national and supranational European courts have recognized identity 
not only as a political safeguard of Europe’s admittedly “sui generis 
community in the process of progressive integration”9 but also, and 
 
3. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 544 (1954) (describing the importance of states’ influence on national actions). 
Recent restatements include Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Two 
Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1355–56 (2001); see also Peter J. 
Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 621 n.120 (1999) (making the 
point that distinctive state-based identities are on the rise). 
4. Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 
84 VA. L. REV. 389, 393 (1998).  
5. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994). Already in the mid-1960s, Robert Dahl argued that “the states 
do not stand out as important institutions of democratic self-government.” Robert A. 
Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 968 (1967). 
6. Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, 
and Political Culture in the American Federal System 122 (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Duke Law Scholarship Repository) [hereinafter Young, The 
Volk of New Jersey?]. 
7. Young, What Can Europe Tell Us, supra note 2, at 1110. The turn to identity 
is part of a larger lesson of European identifies the other lessons of as 1) The EU’s 
capacity to make decisions independent of the Member States is far more limited than 
Congress’s; 2) the EU has far less money to spend, and far less power to raise more, than 
does the American federal government; and 3) the EU depends on Member States almost 
completely to implement European law. Id. at 1116–17. 
8. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 4(2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 4(2) (“The Union shall respect the equality of 
the Member States as well as their national identities inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. 
It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.”).  
9. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] BVerfGE 
37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 Solange I-Beschluß (1974). See also Bruno de Witte, The European 
Union as International Legal Experiment, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Gráinne de Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds, Cambridge Univ. Press 
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importantly, as a doctrine that “[constitutionalizes] national 
identity”10 at both national and European levels.11 This highly 
adaptable doctrine has been used both defensively, as a closure 
mechanism that shields nation-states from deeper supranational 
integration, as well as offensively as a sword against the authority of 
the EU.12 As Joseph Weiler perceptively put it more than a decade ago, 
“[t]o protect national sovereignty is passé; to protect national identity 
by insisting on constitutional specificity is à la mode.”13 Developments 
in recent years suggest that identity has become the new sovereignty. 
 While identity federalism remains at an early, exploratory stage 
in American constitutionalism, the European experience has been 
sufficiently robust to allow an initial assessment, at least in its original 
context. Identity has fundamentally altered the tempo of constitutional 
politics in the EU. Despite hopes that it could serve as a tool of fidelity 
and principled compromise, the foregrounding of identity in 
constitutional discourse and its hardening into doctrine have often led 
to the escalation of long-simmering constitutional conflicts. Actors, 
especially judicial actors, that had been previously open to 
compromise, have become significantly more radicalized in the new 
constitutional landscape. Identity has colonized the self-understanding 
of the national constitutional orders and recast their relationship to 
supranational institutions on a basis that is more structural (which 
 
2012) (arguing that the EU is sui generis); Andrew Moravcsik, The European 
Constitutional Settlement, in SOPHIE MEUNIER & KATHLEEN R. MCNAMARA, MAKING 
HISTORY: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT FIFTY (2007) (arguing 
that the European Union is not a federation).  
10. Pietro Faraguna, Constitutional Identity in the EU—A Shield or a Sword?, 18 
GERMAN L.J. 1617, 1620 (2017).  
11. While this Article studies the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, there have been signs that the concept of constitutional identity has 
also started to impact the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Although the court does not mention constitutional identity explicitly, scholars have seen 
that concept implicitly at work in some of that court’s prominent cases. See Federico 
Fabbrini & András Sajó, The Dangers of Constitutional Identity, 25 EUR. L.J. 457, 461–
62 (2019) (discussing implicit use of constitutional identity in supranational courts).  
12. Id. at 1631 (“The concept [of constitutional identity] is no longer used as a 
shield to protect national constitutional identities against further European integration, 
but as a sword to fend off the authority of EU law over a Member State jurisdiction. This 
trend may generate concern, especially when Member States take up illiberal concepts 
of identity.”).  
13. J.H.H. Weiler, On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional 
Iconography, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 173, 184 (2005). See also NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 3–8 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro 
Llivina eds., 2013) (discussing the shift from sovereignty to identity). Interestingly, 
Flaubert described the concept of constitutional identity as “national or nationalistic 
delirium, dogmatic caprice of law professors, identity card of nation states, modern 
variation of the idea of sovereignty.” GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, DICTIONARY OF RECEIVED 
IDEAS (1911) (mentioned in LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN, L’identité constitutionnelle 
en question, in L’IDENTITE CONSTITUTIONNELLE SAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE 155 
(2011)).  
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institution has the authority to decide what identity is?) rather than 
dialogical (what is the most inclusive or principled manner of making 
such decisions?). Identity has also spread like fire across the legal 
orders of the EU member states. From its original locus in Germany,14 
it has migrated to Spain,15 the United Kingdom,16 the Czech 
Republic,17 Italy,18 Poland,19 and many other jurisdictions in between. 
Identity has arguably become the most successful legal transplant in 
the early twenty-first century.20 Unsurprisingly, identity has shaped 
the legal disputes related to the crises that have recently befallen 
Europe, from the Eurozone crisis (is Germany’s constitutional identity 
infringed when fiscal decisions, such as the decision to bail out Greece, 
are made at the supranational level?21) to the refugee crisis (is 
Hungary’s constitutional identity violated if a EU regulation requires 
it to admit Muslim refugees through a quota system?22) and, more 
recently, the rule-of-law crisis (is Romania’s constitutional identity 
encroached upon by the European Commission’s anticorruption 
recommendations through the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism?23). 
 The institutional corollary of identity federalism has been judicial 
empowerment. Identity—national or constitutional—is an eminently 
vague concept whose interpretation leaves much room for judicial 
discretion.24 The effect has been less a preoccupation with identifying 
the best interpretation of identity than a structural concern with the 
allocation of the authority to interpret its meaning. Thus, even while 
courts have struggled substantively with the task of defining identity, 
 
14. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 23, 
1951, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGe] 14, 32, 50 
(mentioning “identitätsbestimmende Staatsaufgaben”). See also infra Section III. A. 3. 
See also Russell Miller, Germany’s German Constitution, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 95, 96 (2017) 
(arguing that Germany’s Basic Law is a specifically German constitution).  
15. S.T.C., Declaration 1/2004 (Dec 13, 2004).  
16. R v. Sec’y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
17. Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 03.05.2006 (Decision of the Czech 
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006), Pl US 66/04. 
18. Corte Constituzionale (Corte Const.) (Constitutional Court), 24/2017 
(Tarrico). 
19. Case K 32/09, Pol. Const. Trib., Nov. 24, 2010.  
20. On the phenomenon of constitutional migrations, see generally Vlad Perju, 
Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing and Migrations, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304–27 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 
2012).  
21. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court] Jan. 14, 
2014, Order of the Second Senate of 14 Jan. 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13. 
22. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB határozat 
(Hung.).  
23. Romanian Constitutional Court, Judgment nr. 104/2018 and Judgment nr. 
137/2019. 
24. See Fabbrini & Sajó, supra note 11, at 466–69 (identifying arbitrariness and 
indeterminacy as the “normative problems” of constitutional identity).  
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they seem to have uniformly cherished their power to authoritatively 
make such determinations. Judges have been adamant about 
protecting their turf even when substantively they could do no better 
than tie national constitutional identity to general values such as 
“respect for fundamental principles of our constitutional order or the 
inalienable human rights”25 or “the essential attributes of a democratic 
law-based state.”26 Less benignly, in countries such as Hungary and 
Poland, where constitutional courts have been captured by 
authoritarian populists,27 identity doctrines have played a critical role 
in immunizing the authoritarian backsliding from both domestic and 
European attempts to protect the rule of law.28  
 It is, of course, true that many of these features of identity 
federalism pertain to Europe’s specific circumstances. Different 
languages, histories, and legal traditions within Europe give national 
constitutional identity a weight that states lack within the United 
States, where nationalization has brought about greater political, 
cultural, and social integration. There are greater objective differences 
between Italy and Austria than, say, between Vermont and New 
Hampshire. Empirical studies have shown that, for the most part, 
citizens of EU member states see themselves less as Europeans first 
than US citizens define their identity first as American and in 
subsidiary as citizens of their respective states.29 Finally, even if 
identity were to play a similar role in the United States, as a political 
 
25. Federico Fabbrini & Oreste Pollicino, Constitutional identity in Italy: 
European integration as the fulfilment of the Constitution 3 (Eur. Univ. Institute, 
Working Paper No. 6, 2017) (“Italy epitomizes the case of a founding EU member state 
where the supreme institutional actors have never systematically identified a core set of 
fundamental elements or values functionally designed to protect the identity of the polity 
against supranational interference”). 
26. Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 03.05.2006 (Decision of the Czech 
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006), Pl US 66/04, ¶ 82. 
27. See R. Daniel Kelemen, Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National 
Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union, 52 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 211, 227 (2017) 
(describing how populist party won majority of seats in Polish parliament in 2015); 
Laurent Pech & Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in 
the EU, 19 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 3, 9 (2017) (“The cases of Hungary and 
Poland, to mention only the EU examples of a broader international trend, suggest a new 
worrying pattern in the fate of constitutional democracies”). 
28. See Monica Claes & Jan-Herman Reestman, The Protection of National 
Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the 
Gauweiler, 16 GERMAN L.J. 917, 967 (2015) (“The comparative analysis thus reveals a 
clear trend in the case law of national (constitutional) courts to announce constitutional 
limitations regarding participation in European integration and to the effect of EU law 
in the domestic legal order.”).  
29. But see Ernest A. Young, A Comparative Perspective, in OXFORD PRINCIPLES 
OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 142–88 (Robert Schütze & Takis Tridimas eds., 
2018) (discussing identity in both the European and the American contexts an empirical 
matter and suggesting that the alignment of emotional attachments is not as clear as 
traditional scholars have assumed).  
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safeguard or a constitutional doctrine, American federalism has a 
vastly different toolkit and more settled structure, both discursive and 
doctrinal, than the comparatively still-underdeveloped European 
constitutionalism.30 Over six decades after its beginnings,31 Europe 
remains an association of sovereign national states (“Staatenverbund”) 
whose member states, as Brexit is a constant reminder, retain the kind 
of exit options that American states lack.32 EU member states continue 
to oppose including a United States–style supremacy clause in the 
Treaty of Lisbon,33 despite the decade-long case law of the EU’s apex 
court, the Court of the Justice of the European Union (hereinafter 
ECJ), holding that EU law has primacy over national law.34 
Mainstream European constitutional theory still conceptualizes 
relations of authority within the EU as heterarchical, rather than 
hierarchical, and refers to an ethos of constitutional tolerance through 
 
30. See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and 
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 273 (2001) (describing the 
difficulty of comparing constitutional structures: “First, federalism provisions of 
constitutions are often peculiarly the product of political compromise in historically 
situated moments, generally designed as a practical rather than a principled 
accommodation of competing interests. Each federal “bargain” is in important respects 
unique to the parties’ situations, in contrast to constitutional provisions asserted to 
guarantee universal, or natural, or necessary rights of women and men as persons. 
Similar phrases or provisions concerning federalism may have different historical 
meanings in a particular polity, tied in different ways to the political compromises that 
are usually at the foundation of a federal union. Second, not only are federal systems 
agreed to as a compromise, but the compromise typically constitutes an interrelated 
“package” of arrangements.”).  
31. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2407 
(1991) (describing the evolution of the EU toward an interstate structure with “a 
constitutional charter and constitutional principles”).  
32. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700 (1868) (“The Constitution, in all its 
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”); see also 
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1116–17 (discussing Texas’ plan to 
secede in the aftermath of President Obama’s reelection, as well similar efforts in other 
red states including Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee). For a recent study of 
secession in American federalism, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON, NULLIFICATION AND 
SECESSION IN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (2016); see also Jens C. Dammann, Revoking 
Brexit: Can Member States Rescind Their Declaration of Withdrawal from the European 
Union?, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 265, 300–03 (2017) (analyzing Britain’s exit from the 
European Union). 
33. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 2008 O.J. C 115/47, Declaration 17 [hereinafter TFEU], annexed to the Final Act 
of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 
Dec. 2007 (annexation of a declaration to the Treaty of Lisbon); see also JEAN-CLAUDE 
PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 79–81 (2010) (analyzing 
reasons for the member state opposition to formally enshrining supremacy into the 
treaty). 
34. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that “the 
law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its 
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, 
without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of 
the Community itself being called into question.”). 
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which respect for authority as “invited” rather than commended from 
the top down.35 All these features, it is argued, set the EU apart from 
established federal systems.  
 And yet, while acknowledging these differences, it would be 
shortsighted to dismiss the relevance of Europe’s experience with 
identity federalism.36 To start, the Trump era has upended many of the 
formative compromises of American constitutionalism.37 Second, the 
political upheavals of the past decade have intensified the cultural 
debates in which identity plays a central role.38 Third, as the global 
wave of populism has made apparent, American politics and law are 
less insulated than many had thought or might have wished.39 Thus, 
as the search for a new constitutional compromise gets underway, both 
the left and the right could conceivably warm up to a recognizable 
version of identity federalism. Should developments at the discursive 
level gain sufficient traction, identity could become a concept used in 
the process of constitutional interpretation. And from there to doctrinal 
entrenchment there is only one step. The vortex that identity 
federalism could bring about, in its final stage as constitutional 
doctrine but also in its earlier, discursive and interpretative forms, 
might sound promising for projects that aim to revisit the deep 
structure of American constitutionalism. The pace at which identity 
shifts the focus towards the constitutive units of a federative structure 
may seem useful to the project of legitimizing sites of resistance to the 
policies of the federal government. 
 But if such a path is at least imaginable, the EU’s experience 
becomes relevant, not least as a cautionary tale. Identity federalism 
has further juridified the sphere of the political in Europe and turned 
 
35. Joseph Weiler, In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional 
Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 17 (J.H.H. Weiler & 
Marlene Wind eds., 2003).  
36. Such dismissal would rest on some general view of American exceptionalism, 
which has recently been challenged. Recent studies of democratic decay are only the 
latest to show that neither European nor American constitutionalism is as exceptional 
as was traditionally believed. See AZIZ HUQ & TOM GINSBURG, HOW TO SAVE A 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 4 (2018); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW 
DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018).  
37. See Jack Balkin, The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding the Cycles of 
Constitutional Time, 94 IND. L.J. 253, 253 (2019) (discussing the polarization and current 
mood of American politics). 
38. See, for instance, the debates surrounding MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND 
FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS (2017). 
39. The original debate regarding the use of foreign law in constitutional 
interpretation centered almost exclusively on the migration of institutions and doctrines 
that support constitutional liberalism. For a perceptive study of the migration of 
mechanisms used to erode constitutional liberalism, see Kim Lane Scheppele, 
Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-
Constitutional Influence through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003). 
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conflict into turf wars from which courts are unwillingly to step away.40 
It is naïve to hope that a turn to identity could orient American 
federalism away from jurisdictional issues.41 In reality, jurisdictional 
issues return with a vengeance within a framework of identity 
federalism. At play here is the old and familiar logic of sovereignty, 
rather than a “fluid concept of identity, in which constitutional 
assertions of self-definition are part of an ongoing process entailing 
adaptation and adjustment as circumstances dictate.”42 Progressives, 
in particular, should find this feature of identity particularly troubling. 
While identity claims to be a versatile concept capable of supporting 
the project of new “nationalism,”43 its doctrinalization risks reviving 
an old age of American federalism. In that “Federalism 1.0,” as Dean 
Gerken calls it,44 the state and federal government were understood as 
separate spheres of authority whose structural conflicts, derived from 
their inevitable clashes, could be dealt with in a formalist way that 
avoided engagement with the underlying substantive issues. And, in 
the age of populism, those substantive issues include but would 
arguably be more encompassing even than racism, that original sin of 
American federalism,45 as they threaten to empower either specific 
state jurisdictions or the national government—or both—to wreck 
wholesale havoc on the rule of law. 
 Given the early stage of legal developments related to identity 
federalism, any study has by necessity an exploratory dimension. This 
Article does not aim to provide a definitive account of the forms and 
claims of authority and sovereignty involved in these constitutional 
 
40. The relation between political and legal spheres, and specifically the 
juridification of political controversies, have a long history. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 16 (1835); see also ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: 
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001) (both examples of recent studies that have challenged 
the long-held assumption about American litigiousness, especially in comparison with 
Europe. In that debate, Tocqueville’s observation that “[t]here is hardly any political 
question in the United States that sooner or later does not turn into a judicial question” 
had reached status of common wisdom). But see generally DAVID ENGEL, THE MYTH OF 
THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (2016); R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011) 
(documenting the centrality of law and litigation in the EU). 
  41.  Id. 
42. GARY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 13 (2010).  
43. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 
YALE L.J. 1889, 1894 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism]; 
see also Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. 
LOUIS L. REV. 997, 997 (2015) (proposing a détente between traditional and new 
nationalism) [hereinafter Gerken, Time for a Détente?]. 
44. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1695 (2017) 
(distinguishing three ages of American federalism) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism 3.0]; 
see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7–24 (3d ed. 2000).  
45. See WILLIAM K. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 
(1964) (“if . . . one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.”), cited in 
Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 44, at 1708.  
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rearrangements. Its aim is rather to provide a preliminary map of 
these developments, to identify the constitutive parts of national 
constitutional identity, and to introduce and frame the general debates 
surrounding identity federalism. Part I explores if identity takes shape 
around similarity or difference, the choice of national versus 
constitutional identity and, finally, the mandate of institutions such as 
courts in defining identity. Part II introduces the state identity in 
American experience, starting with the dismissal of the identitarian 
framework post–New Deal and continuing through its recent revival. 
Part III turns to the lessons from Europe. After placing identity in the 
context of strategies of national resistance to supranational 
integration, it studies the use of identity within the constitutional case 
law of the EU member states, both as a self-standing tool as well in the 
hands of authoritarian populist governments. In Part IV, this Article 
draws on the lessons of this comparative analysis and discusses some 
of the possible future(s) of identity federalism. This Article ends with 
a brief conclusion.  
II. THEORIZING IDENTITY   
 The question of what constitutes identity has been called one of 
“the hardest question[s] of constitutional law.”46 This Part discusses 
three aspects relevant to the subsequent analysis. Part II.A. takes up 
the definition of identity, and specifically the issue of identity as a 
matter of resistance or belonging. Part II.B. discusses the type of 
identity—national or constitutional—relationship, and the factors 
associated with each. Finally, Part II.C. turns to some of the 
institutional implications and specifically the authority of courts in the 
process of defining the meaning of identity.  
A. Similarity versus Difference 
 The most common understanding of identity in a legal context 
refers to the essential characteristics that set a jurisdiction apart from 
all others and thus define its individuality.47 France is not Germany 
 
46. Mark Tushnet, How Do Constitutions Constitute Constitutional Identity?, 8 
INT'L J. CONST. L. 671 (2010). Somewhat more plastically, a Dutch historian once likened 
the concept of identity to “a jellyfish on the beach – to be observed with interest, but not 
to be touched.” Barbara Oomen, Strengthening Constitutional Identity when there is 
none: the case of the Netherlands, 77 REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D’ETUDES JURIDIQUES 
235, 238 (2016). 
47. Gerhard van der Schyff, EU Member State Constitutional Identity, 76 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSSLANDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 1, 3 (2016) 
(defining “constitutional identity as “the individuality or essence of an order”); see also 
Michel Troper, Behind the Constitution? The Principle of Constitutional Identity in 
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and Texas is not California. While each has much in common with the 
other, they remain nevertheless different in ways that are relevant. 
When a polity passes a certain threshold of cultural, social and political 
homogeneity, it means that those distinctive elements are no longer in 
place. Edward Rubin’s views capture this well in the context of the 
United States. Writing in 2001, he argued that  
[a]t present, the United States is a socially homogenized and politically 
centralized nation . . . With the minor exceptions of Utah and Hawaii, there is 
no American state with a truly distinctive social profile . . . Our political culture 
is more uniform still . . . Most important, the primary political loyalty of the vast 
majority of Americans is to the nation.48 
Note here the impact of uniformity, homogenization, and 
centralization on the distinctive state identities. While Texas does not 
become California, to return to my example above, the differences 
between them are not greater than what federalism can accommodate. 
That is because federalism already has built into it a certain breathing 
space, or degree of respect, for value pluralism. As Mark Tushnet has 
argued, “federalism has its attractions as a principle of government 
almost entirely because it provides an almost unassailable base for 
value-pluralism.”49 
 Difference and sameness are to some extent facets of the same 
coin. Texas is similar to California, and thus both are different from 
Mexico. Italy is similar to Austria, and both of them are different from 
Morocco. If one looks at the formation of identity, one notices that the 
two types of relations are not independent of each other. The forging of 
a common identity has often required the existence of an outsider in 
opposition to which one discovers, or constructs, one’s own identity.50 
The Roman Empire held itself as different from the Germanic tribes in 
central Europe, and Europe has always played the role of the “other” 
for the United States.  
 The question of the “other” in the formation of identity becomes 
more complex when identity is seen in a dynamic perspective, through 
its formation or process of becoming. Anyone with a passing knowledge 
of European history is familiar with the deep differences between 
French and German national identities, and about how each identity 
 
France, in ANDRAS SAJO & RENATA UITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL TOPOGRAPHY: VALUES AND 
CONSTITUTIONS 187–204 (2010).  
48. Edward Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 43 (2001).  
49. Mark Tushnet, Comment, What Then Is the American?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 
876 (1996), cited in Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1121 (Bulman-
Pozen also notes that “[f]ederalism renders diversity a defining structural feature of the 
United States”). 
50. See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005); 
AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY (2006).  
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formed itself in opposition to the other.51 Has the process of European 
integration altered this mode of identity formation? Here is the 
affirmative answer of a constitutional court in another EU member 
state: “[t]he idea of confirming one’s national identity in solidarity with 
other nations, and not against them, constitutes,” in the words of the 
Polish Constitutional Court, “the main axiological basis of the 
European Union.”52 This view, that the process of European identity 
creates identity through solidarity, rather than through opposition,53 
is connected to the view of European integration as a fundamental 
commitment to diversity and toleration of the other, which requires 
fundamental changes internal to the municipal jurisdictions. The 
European constitutional architecture preserves the plurality of distinct 
political identities, and political self-determination, as a “civilizing 
strategy of dealing with the ‘other.’”54 The nonhierarchical relations of 
mutual accommodation or “constitutional tolerance.”55 By contrast to 
traditional federative states, such as the United States, where the 
center mandates obedience, the European supranational political 
formation is voluntary in nature and, therefore, obedience is “invited.” 
Given the special historical conditions in which it developed, 
“European constitutionalism is constructed with a top-to-bottom 
hierarchy of norms, but with a bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority and 
real power.”56 The outcome is harmonization, rather than 
homogenization, and is accordingly less violent. This process is best 
understood as the political expression of the nonbinary conception of a 
rich, layered identity. National and European identities can coexist so 
long as they are not mutually exclusionary.57  
 
51. See generally ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE 
AND GERMANY (1992).  
52. Case K 32/09, Pol. Const. Trib., Nov. 24, 2010. See also Mattias Kumm, Why 
Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional Patriotism, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 117, 120 
(2008) (“the universality of an ideal does not make it formally inadequate as an ideal 
central to the identity of a particular community”).  
53. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Thick Constitutional Patriotism and Its 
Implications for the Role and Structure of European Legal History, in DIALOGUES ON 
JUSTICE: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND HUMANITIES 108 (Helle Porsdam & 
Thomas Elholm eds., 2012). 
54. Weiler, supra note 35, at 20.  
55. Id. at 17 (referring to the corollary of this principle of constitutional tolerance, 
understood as the “normative hallmark of European federalism.”). 
56. Id. at 9.  
57. See Armin von Bogdandy, The European Lessons for International Democracy: 
The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty for International Organizations, 23 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 315, 322 (2012) (referring to the “dual structure of democratic legitimation” – an 
“innovative concept of democracy”). The philosophical view that informs this conception 
sees individuals as holders of sovereignty with a dual political identity: both as citizens 
of their Member States and, concomitantly, as citizens of the to-be-created EU. See 
Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a 
Constitutionalization of International Law, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 335, 342–43 (2012) 
(“Article 1(1) of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe refers to both subjects, 
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 European constitutionalism thus at least attempts to 
problematize the distinction between similarity and difference in the 
conception of identity. Whether it is successful in that attempt 
remains, at least at this stage, an open question. The next Parts will 
argue that, in practice, identity has generally not been the tool once 
envisaged for mutual accommodation and tolerance. Nor is it apparent 
to what extent this model accurately captures the dynamics of 
European integration. The recent crises that have befallen the EU—
from the Eurozone crisis to the refugee crisis to Brexit—have certainly 
put pressure on the European model of social integration. The question 
for now, however, is less evaluative and more technical: Does European 
constitutionalism impact national identity directly, or is its impact 
through the displacement, or modification, of national identity through 
distinctively constitutional identity?  
B. National versus Constitutional Identity 
 It seems uncontroversial to posit that national identity encases a 
nation’s historical, cultural, social, and political experience. But what 
about its constitution? National identity could be seen as part of 
constitutional identity,58 or, conversely, constitutional identity can be 
part of national identity.59 In another, and particularly influential 
view, constitutional identity is distinct from national identity. As 
Michel Rosenfeld argues, “all constitutions depend on elaboration of a 
constitutional identity that is distinct from national identity and from 
all other relevant pre-constitutional and extra-constitutional 
 
the ‘citizens’ and the ‘states’ of Europe. Even though this constitution drawn up by a 
convention in 2004 was never adopted, the Lisbon Treaty currently in effect supports the 
thesis that sovereignty is ‘shared’ between citizens and states.”) (citations omitted). See 
also id. at 343 (“Citizens are involved on both sides within the higher-level political 
community — directly in their role as Union citizens, and indirectly in their role as 
citizens of the Member States.”); see also Jürgen Habermas, Citizen and State Equality 
in a Supranational Political Community: Degressive Proportionality and the Pouvoir 
Constituant Mixte, J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 171 (2017). The difficulty has been to put the 
two identities on equal par in a way that is at least prima facie sustainable. For if 
sustainability is not secured, then theories of divided sovereignty do little other than 
delay or obscure but certainly not overcome the binary choice between conflicting claims 
to absolute supremacy. See Vlad Perju, Double Sovereignty in Europe? A Critique of 
Habermas's Defense of the Nation-State, 53 TEX. INT'L L.J. 49, 53 (2018); Vlad Perju, The 
Asymmetries of Pouvoir Constituant Mixte, 25 EUR. L.J. (forthcoming 2019).  
58. See Leonard F. M. Besselink, National and Constitutional Identity Before and 
After Lisbon, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 36, 42–44 (2010) (describing the intersection between 
national and constitutional identity). 
59. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Criminal Proceedings Against Stefano 
Melloni, Case C-399/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:600, ¶ 137 (“I would make it clear that the 
position which I propose that the Court should adopt in the present case does not mean 
that account is not to be taken of the national identity of the Member States, of which 
constitutional identity certainly forms a part.”).  
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identities.”60 Successful constitutions, in this view, gain the kind of 
political and social traction that in turn shapes a community’s 
collective identity.  
 As far as constitutional identity is concerned, the question is 
where to locate the identity elements of constitutional identity. If one 
focuses on the text, preambles seem like a good place to start. It is well 
known that preambles usually include references to abstract values.61 
Their rhetorical effect can be quite powerful, and sometimes courts 
have incorporated preambles into the enforceable parts of the 
constitutional text.62 The preamble to the U.S. Constitution is central 
to Dean Chemerinsky’s project for a progressive revival of American 
constitutionalism.63 Constitutions also mark identity through so-called 
eternity clauses, that is, through provisions that the constitution itself 
immunizes from future amendment. For example, the German Basic 
Law lists the principle that Germany is a democracy and the protection 
of the right to dignity as provisions that cannot be amended.64 This is 
not to imply that such provisions can never be changed, but that—
absent amendments to the ban itself—their changes would require the 
adoption of another constitution. Put differently, these eternity 
provisions encapsulate something so fundamental about the identity of 
an entire constitutional order that the possibility of changing them 
would alter that identity in ways that the constitutional drafters 
thought impermissible. The fundamental distinction at play here, most 
thoroughly theorized in the work of Carl Schmitt, is between 
subconstitutional or ordinary constitutional amendments, which can 
be undertaken by the people’s representatives because they do not alter 
the identity of a constitutional order, and amendments that do engage 
that identity and must therefore require the approval of the people as 
 
60. MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: 
SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY 10 (2010). See also Michel 
Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 758 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2013) (arguing that “it 
is easily to conceive of the French or German nation without reference to a 
constitution.”).  
61. See, e.g., Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 714, 714 (2011).  
62. See JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 15–17 (2008) (in France, 
the Constitutional Council incorporated the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution into the 
block of constitutional provisions, or bloc de constitutionnalité).  
63. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 53–60 (2018) (noting that the preamble 
is “the obvious place to begin discerning the values of the Constitution” and that 
“[unfortunately] . . . it has been largely ignored in Supreme Court decisions and in 
scholarly writings.”).  
64. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663 (2010) (for 
a general discussion of eternity clauses); Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity 
Clauses”: The German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 436 (2011). 
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the ultimate sovereign.65 This is a redline conception of identity, which 
defines the limits of the relation between nation-states and 
supranational institutions. This conception has resulted from the 
“constitutionalization of national identity,”66 which has been a gradual 
process of “distancing the notion of national identity . . . [in Article 4(2) 
Treaty on European Union] from cultural, historical or linguistic 
criteria and turns to the content of domestic constitutional orders.”67   
C. Courts versus Culture  
 As mentioned above in the European context, the 
constitutionalization of national identity empowers judges and creates 
an institutional imbalance. The same conclusion seems warranted 
when looking at American constitutional law. George Fletcher has 
argued that judges should turn to constitutional identity in hard cases 
about basic issues of constitutional law.68 Instead of turning outward 
toward overarching principles of political morality, “the acceptable way 
to resolve the disputes and explain the results is to turn ‘inward’ and 
reflect upon the legal culture in which the dispute is embedded. The 
way to understand this subcategory of decisions is to interpret them as 
expressions of the decision makers’ constitutional identities.”69 There 
will, of course, be disagreement about the meaning of constitutional 
identity. Such disagreement is to be expected since the concept of 
identity itself is, in a Dworkian sense, an interpretative concept.70  
 
65. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 
Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928) (“The boundaries of the authority for constitutional 
amendments result from the properly understood concept of constitutional change. The 
authority to “amend the constitution,” granted by constitutional legislation, means that 
other constitutional provisions can substitute for individual or multiple ones. They may 
do so, however, only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the 
constitution as an entirety is preserved.”). See also Monika Polzin, Constitutional 
Identity, Unconstitutional Amendments and the Idea of Constituent Power: The 
Development of the Doctrine of Constitutional Identity in German Constitutional Law, 14 
INT’L J. CONST. L.  411, 411 (2016).  
66. Faraguna, supra note 10, at 1620. See also Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of 
Democracy in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 271, 
280 (2013) (“an essential component of the national identity of Member States, the 
democratic arrangements provided for by national constitutions are not to be 
undermined by EU law . . . . [F]or national constitutional courts, the EU’s commitment 
to respecting national democracies is an essential element without which European 
integration would come to an immediate halt”).  
67. Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: 
Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417, 
1422 (2011). 
68. George Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 737 (1992). 
69. Id. at 737–40 (discussing from this perspective central cases such as Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).  
70. RONALD DWORKIN, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political 
Philosophy, in JUSTICE IN ROBES 140 (2006) (positing a distinction between natural 
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 Other scholars have argued that questions of identity should be 
taken away from the courts and given to other institutional actors.71 
As shown in the next Parts of this Article, this is a particularly 
important matter since judicial monopoly over constitutional identity 
leads almost inevitably to judicial aggrandizement. The German 
Constitutional Court, for instance, has held that “the protection of the 
latter is a task of the Federal Constitutional Court alone.”72 By 
contrast, the French Constitutional Council has held that EU 
legislation must not violate a rule or principle inherent in the 
constitutional identity of France except when the constituent power 
has consented to such reversal.73 To be sure, such consent can be given 
directly by the constituent power or through the people’s elected 
representatives reunited in both houses of parliament. The French 
Council has declined the power to review both when the authorization 
is direct,74 as well as when it is mediated.75 These differences in 
approach reflect deeper constitutional traditions in France and 
Germany.76  
 It is not too difficult to see how national identity can be taken 
away from courts. But can constitutional identity be taken away from 
courts? The starting point for an answer is to detach constitutional 
identity from the constitutional text. As constitutions enter their life 
cycle, the constitutional text becomes the basis of a dialogue between 
the public officials, including courts, and the larger country. Robert 
Post has argued that constitutional law “and culture are locked in a 
dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law arises from and in 
turn regulates culture.”77 This “dialogical engagement between the 
core commitment(s) and its external environment,” as Gary Jacobsohn 
 
concepts that exist in the natural world and can be described through an accurate 
assessment of the convention among speakers of the same language, and interpretative 
concepts, such as law, equality, liberty or justice, that have no normative DNA and whose 
meaning requires an exploration into what makes them valuable). 
71. See, e.g., Pietro Faraguna, Taking Constitutional Identities Away from the 
Courts, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 491, 491 (2016).  
72. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court] Sept. 6, 
2012, No. 2 BvR 2728/13, at ¶ 29. 
73. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 62-20DC, 
Nov. 6, 1962 (Fr.) (declining to invalidate results of a referendum that President De 
Gaulle had called on the question of the direct election of the French President in 
apparent violation of the constitutional procedures for calling such referenda). 
74. Id.  
75. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2003-469DC, 
Mar. 26, 2003, ¶ 2–3 (Fr.).  
76. See Jan-Herman Reestman, The Franco-German Constitutional Divide. 
Reflections on National and Constitutional Identity, 5 EU CONST. 374, 378 (2009) 
(discussing French and German identity characteristics). See also Claes & Reestman, 
supra note 28.  
77. Robert Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).  
2020] IDENTITY FEDERALISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 223 
 
puts it in his study of constitutional identity, favors a “fluid concept of 
identity, in which constitutional assertions of self definition are part of 
an ongoing process entailing adaptation and adjustment as 
circumstances dictate.”78 This dialectical conception of constitutional 
identity means that disharmony “within and around the constitution 
is key to understanding its identity.”79 It is, of course, noteworthy that 
this dialectical conception of identity, which results from the 
interaction between formal institutions and background culture, was 
theorized in the United States. Article V makes constitutional 
amendments notoriously difficult to implement, especially under 
conditions of deep political polarization, although, at least formally, no 
constitutional provision is eternal in the sense used above.80  It was 
the politics of growing polarization that made the Constitution immune 
from change, and in that particular sense eternal.  
III. IDENTITY AS A POLITICAL SAFEGUARD: THE CASE OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM  
 Federalism may be “our Nation’s own discovery,” as Justice 
Kennedy wrote,81 but it was not until the federalism revolution of the 
Rehnquist Court that core debates about the nature and role of state 
sovereignty returned with a vengeance on the agenda of American 
constitutionalism.82 At least since the New Deal, and arguably even 
earlier, the idea that each state formed a “distinct society . . . [with its 
own] distinct ethno-cultural identity”83 might have been a view of 
historians but received little support in constitutional doctrine and was 
derided by political scientists. In 1933, political science scholar Luther 
Gulick argued that “[t]he American state is finished. I do not predict 
that the states will go, but affirm that they have gone.”84 As towering 
a figure as Robert A. Dahl argued that “the states do not stand out as 
 
78. JACOBSOHN, supra note 42, at 13. 
79. Id. at 15.  
80. Vicki C. Jackson, The (Myth of Un)Amendability of the US Constitution and 
the Democratic Component of Constitutionalism, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 575, 577 (2015) 
(the US Constitution is amended less than other national constitutions and far less than 
state constitutions). See generally YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS (2017); RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (2019). 
81. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
82. But see Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 44, at 1698–1708 (arguing for 
jettisoning the mistaken assumptions of the New Deal that state and national power 
should be conceived of in sovereignty-like terms). 
83. Daniel J. Elazar, Foreword: The Moral Compass of State Constitutionalism, 
30 RUTGERS L.J. 849, 861 (1999). 
84. Luther Gulick, Reorganization of the State, 3 CIV. ENGINEERING 420, 421 
(1933), cited in Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 122. 
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important institutions of democratic self-government.”85 To be sure, 
federalism calls for the existence of a dual level of government to which 
citizens owe their loyalties.86 James Madison saw divided loyalties as 
giving federalism the vitality and guiding principles to protect political 
freedom.87 That insight was not lost on contemporary political 
theorists.88 The difficulty, however, was to find how that political 
concept informed a constitutional approach that, for much of the 
twentieth century, had consistently interpreted Congress’s commerce 
powers very broadly.  
 The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival changed that.89 In a 
string of cases that have redefined the arc of American federalism, the 
Supreme Court struck down federal legislation—from the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 198590 to the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 199091 and the Violence Against Women Act of 
199492—as encroaching upon the powers and rights that the 
Constitution allocates to states. This development was perceived, 
understandably, as a vindication of the states but also of the federal 
system.93 As the Supreme Court put it, the federal and state 
 
85. Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
953, 968 (1967). See also Antoni Abati Ninet & James A. Gardner, Distinctive Identity 
Claims in Federal Systems: Judicial Policing of Subnational Variance, 14 INT'L J. CONST. 
L. 378, 396 (2016) (“In the United States, distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious 
groups tend to be geographically dispersed, and even where they are concentrated, as in 
urban areas, they tend not to comprise majorities capable of exercising political control 
at the regional level. That dispersion, combined with a longstanding national project of 
assimilation, has tended to undermine the conditions necessary for ethnocultural 
distinctiveness to evolve into the kind of substate nationalism sometimes encountered 
elsewhere. As a result, American states today rarely assert any kind of distinct identity 
or sovereignty.”).  
86. See RIKER, supra note 45, at 136 (“[F]ederalism is maintained by the existence 
of dual citizen loyalties to the two levels of government.”). 
87. THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 48–51 (James Madison). 
88. See, e.g., Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of 
Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459, 465 (2007) (observing that, for the Federalists, 
“[l]oyalty to the states . . . [was] the general protection against the new constitutional 
order going awry”). 
89. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
90. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992) (striking down 
certain provisions of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985 on the ground that they improperly “commandeered” state legislative processes). 
91. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (striking down the 
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the ground that it fell outside Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause). 
92. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000) (holding that parts of 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 were unconstitutional as they were not included 
in Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution).  
93. See Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing that the 
Framers’ idea that the competition for loyalty between the national government and the 
States requires that “neither side totally win this competition”).  
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governments will act as mutual restraints “only if both are credible.”94 
Defending the credibility of the federal government was not a 
particularly onerous task, in light of decades of judicial deference to 
Congress. But establishing the credibility of states required both 
resolve and imagination. Any such account would need more than just 
an abstract restatement of state sovereignty. It would need an 
argument about commitment and, possibly, state identity. As John O. 
McGinnis has argued, successful federalism requires “citizens’ 
emotional attachments to their states.”95 Are citizens emotionally 
attached to their states?  
A. Identity and Politics  
 The dominant answer among scholars has been a resounding no. 
Malcom Feeley and Edward Rubin pointed out that “the American 
people . . . have a unified political identity. Not only do they identify 
themselves primarily as Americans, but they insist on normative 
uniformity throughout the nation.”96 Similarly, James A. Gardner 
remarked that there is “a general absence of public identification with 
the polity defined by the state,”97 and Robert Schapiro referred to 
debates about state character as “pointless, indeed often silly.”98 
 If this position sounds uncompromising, it is important to 
understand it correctly in its narrow focus. While there are obvious 
differences between states, these differences might not be of the kind 
that translate into different identities. They are, for example, economic 
differences, rather than differences rooted in historical or cultural 
distinctions.99 Conversely, it might be possible, and it is indeed likely, 
that people form the kind of attachments that are constitutive of 
identity at subnational but not state levels. As Jessica Bulman-Pozen 
argues, “although the United States is not a homogenous polity, 
American heterogeneity does not closely track state borders.”100 This 
 
94. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991). 
95. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 526 (2002) (arguing that 
successful federalism requires “citizens’ emotional attachments to their states.”). 
96. MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM 115 (2008). See also 
Jacob T. Levy, Federalism and the New and Old Liberalisms, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 306, 
316 (2007) (“[L]oyalty to states . . . has dwindled to almost nothing in most parts of the 
United States”). 
97. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 761, 830 (1992). 
98. Schapiro, supra note 4, at 393.  
99. Rubin, supra note 48, at 43 (“At present, the United States is a socially 
homogenized and politically centralized nation. Regional differences between different 
parts of the nation are minimal, and those that exist are based on inevitable economic 
variations, rather than any historical or cultural distinctions.”). 
100. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1110.  
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might have to do with the social and geographic mobility that leads to 
“regional rather than state distinctiveness.”101 This distinctiveness 
could also develop at lower levels of government, around cities102 and 
counties.103 
  Severing the link between emotional attachment and political 
loyalty to states has far-reaching implications for American federalism. 
At the level of constitutional doctrine, it suggests, as Robert Schapiro 
has argued, that “the Supreme Court need not protect enclaves of state 
policy autonomy because such autonomy would be meaningful only if 
it reflected distinctive state political communities—which no longer 
exist.”104 That observation is even more radical at the level of 
constitutional theory. If federalism requires dual attachment, and if in 
the American context, attachment to state government lacks, that 
seems to put into question the very nature of the state. Federalism may 
have been our “national neurosis,”105 but is that still the correct label 
for the United States? The implications of no longer seeing the United 
States as a federation, but, in one view, a centralized administrative 
state,106 are of course momentous. These consequences register not 
only at the level of citizen attachment, as important as those may be,107 
but also systemically through how the erosion of popular attachment 
dilutes the loyalty of public officials.108 The political safeguards of 
federalism depend on the national effect of how state officials exercise 
their public duties.109 The concern is that the dilution of citizen 
 
101. Id. at 1110–11 (arguing that “half of Americans age twenty-five and older do 
not live in their state of birth, and more than a quarter of American adults have lived in 
three or more states. To the extent the states reflect cultural differences, regional rather 
than state distinctiveness is likely to be what matters.”).  
102. Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 106–10 (discussing 
attachments to cities). 
103. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term — Foreword: 
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2010) (discussing federalism at 
the local level) [hereinafter Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term]; see also David 
Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 377 (2001) 
(discussing the tensions between different sites of government). 
104. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009). 
105. Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 903 (1994). 
106. Id.  
107. Sidney Verba, Comparative Political Culture, in SIDNEY VERBA & LUCIAN 
PYE, POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 512 (1965) (“[i]t is the sense of 
identity with the nation that legitimizes the activities of national elites and makes it 
possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers.”). 
108. H.L.A. Hart argued that the authority of law is established when state 
officials take the internal standpoint and see themselves as bound to follow it. See H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 111 (1962) (connecting the existence of a legal system with 
state officials acceptance of its binding authority). 
109. See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 955–56 (2001) (describing threats to federalism and 
the response of state officials); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
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loyalties sooner or later does have an effect in how officials discharge 
their duties. 
 The impact on American federalism of a lack of citizens’ 
attachment to their states explains partly the reluctance to fully 
embrace this line of reasoning. Another, and arguably weightier, 
reason has to do with the constitutional text and the existing 
constitutional structure. At that level, the issue is one of reconciling 
the lack of state identity with the existing institutional framework. 
Some of the most innovative works in American federalism over the 
past few decades have sought to answer that challenge. Robert 
Schapiro, for example, has argued for a “polyphonic federalism” that 
protects a plurality of sources of authority and facilitates their 
interaction.110 Since states are evidently one of these centers of 
authority, he has concluded that the Constitution should protect their 
“institutional integrity and . . . the continued functioning of each state’s 
political apparatus.”111 Implicit in this position is a realignment of the 
idea of state identity with a different set of attachments. Without 
denying the reality of political polarization, increased cultural 
homogenization sets off a search for other—“civic identities”112—to 
ground citizens’ attachments. These identities would be looser, more 
flexible, and indeed contingent but could nevertheless work as the 
functional equivalent of unavailable, and perhaps undesirable, deeper 
forms of state attachments of the kind no longer available in the 
American republic.113  
 These new forms of identity would be “critical political 
commitments.”114 Such commitments could, of course, be interpreted 
from the normative prism as different and localized interpretations of 
values that the entire nation shares.115 But these forms of political 
attachments can be both thinner and equally consequential for the 
 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543–58 (1954) (identifying several safeguards of 
federalism dependant upon actions of state officials). 
110. SCHAPIRO, supra note 104, at 92. 
111. Id. at 96. 
112. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2221 (1998) [hereinafter Jackson, Federalism]. 
113. See Daniel Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1243, 
1260 (2011) (common agendas and objectives tie together citizens of a state).  
114. See Ernest Young, What Does It Take to Make a Federal System? On 
Constitutional Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831, 843 
(2011) (arguing that state identity can rest on “critical political commitments”). 
115. See Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State 
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1166 (1993) (highlighting the similarities 
between disparate states). In this sense, the states would offer different conceptions of 
the unifying national concepts. For the distinction between concept and conception, see 
generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1998).  
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overall constitutional structure.116 In an earlier piece that anticipated 
subsequent developments, Vicki Jackson argued that using thick 
identities as the only acceptance grounding citizens’ state loyalty, and 
consequently dismissing federalism on that basis, “ignores the degree 
to which the political structures of state and local governments provide 
organizing points for the development and maintenance of political 
opposition to the national government.”117 The most representative 
recent work in this direction is Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s, who 
disconnects state identity from cultural attachment but connects it 
with ideological partisanship, whose effects run sufficiently deep as to 
enter the territory of identity.118 Specifically, Bulman-Pozen argues 
that “our sense of what it means to be an American, our national 
identity, is mediated by partisanship,”119 citing further the work of 
social psychologists that “Red and Blue have become distinct ways of 
being “‘American.’”120 Using “more fluid and contingent forms of state 
identity,” she finds that “partisanship emerges as a key variable, a 
reason for individuals to channel loyalty and affiliation toward states 
rather than toward the nation alone.”121  
B. The Conservative Revival  
 Recent work, from both conservative and progressive quarters, 
has started to shift the focus back on state identity. In a recent paper, 
Ernest Young sought to offer the first comprehensive assessment of the 
distinctiveness of American states from one another and explore the 
attachments of American citizens to their states.122 Young probes the 
empirical claim that the latter are lacking and finds evidence of “the 
states’ geographic, demographic, and policy diversity, states’ impact on 
political preferences, relative trust in state and federal institutions, 
state’s distinct historical narratives, and the impact of individual 
mobility among the states.”123 His conclusion, that reports of the death 
of state identity are greatly exaggerated, is particularly important in 
 
116. See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: 
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 769 (1995) (“[N]ationwide 
crosscutting cleavages make American federalism stable because they give it a 
Madisonian plurality of interest groups, no one of which is likely to terrorize the others 
on a permanent basis.”).  
117. Jackson, Federalism, supra note 112, at 2218 n.177. 
118. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1114.  
119. Id. 
120. Abraham M. Rutchick & Collette P. Eccleston, Ironic Effects of Invoking 
Common Ingroup Identity, 32 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 111 (2010), cited in 
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1114.  
121. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1108–9. 
122. Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6. 
123. Id. at i.  
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the larger context of Young’s analysis of federalism.124 It was a 
mistake, he argues by looking at the European experience, to channel 
the interpretative resources of American federalism toward the scope 
of regulatory jurisdiction.125 From the early Republic through the 
Lochner-era and even during the Rehnquist federalist revival, there 
had never been consistent or particularly effective constitutional 
constraints on the scope of congressional regulation and thus on the 
powers of the national government.126 The reference to Europe is 
important in this context because, as later shown in this Article, 
European federalism recognizes relatively broad jurisdiction for the 
central, or supranational, institutions without, however, making 
federalism any less meaningful. The explanation, in Young’s view, is a 
system of representation in supranational institutions that limits the 
EU’s capacity to make decisions independently of its member states, 
limits the financial resources available to the supranational 
authorities,127 and puts member states in charge of implementing 
European law, subject to some degree of supranational oversight. 
These are structural safeguards whose implementation follows the 
logic of political engagement. That political–pragmatic “would” should 
be the focus of federalism studies rather than the jurisdictional “could” 
that assumes the national government will go as far as its formal legal 
powers will allow it.128 
 It is in this larger context that, Young argues, scholars of 
American federalism should turn their attention to identity.129 His 
discussion follows the question of identification.130 Many Europeans 
consider themselves Italian, Spaniards, or Poles first, and only after 
that Europeans.131 By contrast, it is assumed that Americans think of 
themselves first as such only in subsidiary, and not consistently, as 
Vermonters, Californians, or North Carolinians.132 But, Young argues, 
the reality might be more complex.133 There is evidence of polarization 
and fragmentation across the American political landscape, which 
 
124. See id. at 123. 
125. See id. at 25. 
126. Young, What Can Europe Tell Us, supra note 2, at 1121. 
127. Id. at 1118 (arguing that “EU revenue comes predominantly from three 
sources: duties on imports, collected by the Member States and transferred to the EU; a 
share of the value-added tax collected by the Member States; and a levy on the gross 
national income of each Member State capped at slightly under 1.3 percent.”).  
128. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 177 
YALE L.J. 408 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a Constitutional Principle, 83 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1057 (2015). 
129. Young, What Can Europe Tell Us, supra note 2. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 1124. 
132. See id. 
133. See id.  
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impacts issues of state identity.134 Moreover, issues of identity are not 
preinstitutional, but rather the outcome of institutional structures.135 
Put differently, it is remarkable that citizens’ attachment to their 
states has survived in any degree the homogenization under an 
institutional structure that “one nation” doctrines of federalism have 
imposed as orthodoxy throughout the twentieth century.136 But when 
that institutional framework is loosened, and more authority is 
recognized to states, the degree of citizens’ attachment to their states 
will grow deeper.137 The political energy that such attachment would 
unleash is, in Young’s view, part of the universe of political possibility 
and doctrinal opportunity that renewed attention to the question of 
state identity can bring to the fore.138 
C.  The Progressive Revival  
 The rediscovery of states is not exclusively a conservative project. 
Past are the days of civil-rights federalism when the project of political 
emancipation went hand in hand with a defense of central authority.139 
Under today’s version of Federalism 3.0, as Gerken calls it, the 
boundaries between state and federal has become much more porous 
and the interplay between the two levels of government reflects the 
complexity of the regulatory and discursive realities of contemporary 
society.140 Under this new logic, devolution to states does not promote 
state-centered ends and centralization promotes nationalist ones, as 
the sovereign-centered, old interpretation of federalism assumed. 
Rather than sites where “groups can shield themselves from national 
policy, national politics, or national norms,” states are “the sites where 
we battle over—and forge—national policy, national politics, and 
 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at 1111 (arguing that scholars need to look to institutions for an 
understanding of identity).  
136. See id. at 1115–16 (describing the effects of federalism doctrines on legal 
culture). 
137. See id. at 1138–39 (“it is not hard to imagine . . . a de-escalation by returning 
some of these divisive issues to jurisdictions where they can be resolved”). 
138. Id. at 1124–25 (“The basic question whether Americans identify with their 
states breaks down into a host of more specific issues, all of which deserve further 
investigation. Do the states represent distinct political communities that meaningfully 
affect political beliefs? To what extent do personal attachments to states affect political 
behavior? And do attachments to states trade off with, or complement, loyalty to the 
nation? Few American legal scholars have taken these questions seriously, but they go 
to the basic sociological underpinnings of federalism. The European literature has long 
had a much better handle on these questions and it is time Americans paid more 
attention to them.”).  
139. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 
(1964) (“[I]f . . . one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.”). 
140. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 44, at 1696.  
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national norms.”141 An entire school of nationalism in federalism 
studies seeks to show how devolution can serve nationalist, rather than 
state-centered, aims.142 The implications are twofold. First, since 
states return to the fore, the question of what underpins their appeal 
and ultimate authority is also making a comeback. The answer need 
not submit to the logic of sovereignty, which, by contrast to 
conservative federalists,143 the school of progressive federalism 
considers to be passé.144 Some of the scholars in the later camp, such 
as Dean Gerken, shy away from the language of identity.145 Other 
scholars, from the younger generation, have proven to be somewhat 
more comfortable with a fluid and contingent approach to identity.146 
It is certainly too early to draw definitive conclusions as to whether 
identity will be a normative medium for progressive federalism. Such 
conclusions must await the political challenges that await 
progressivism in the Trump, and post-Trump, age.  
 Here, this Article comes upon the second implication of the 
(re)turn to states. If states participate in the making of national policy 
and norms, then one should expect to see them use both their political 
and legal powers to influence the landscape of federal law.147 And, 
indeed, as Jessica Bulman-Pozen has argued, states have been 
involved in the separation of powers at the federal level by seeking “to 
defend federal legislative prerogatives against the federal executive 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1722–23 (“Neither the federal government nor the states preside over 
their own empire; instead, they regulate shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space, 
sometimes leaning on one another and sometimes deliberately jostling each other. So, 
too, states are no longer enclaves that facilitate retreats from national norms. Instead, 
they are the sites where those norms are forged. And while local and state structures 
were once condemned solely as tools for blocking racial change, they also provide crucial 
structures for seeking change.”). See generally Gerken, Federalism as the New 
Nationalism, supra note 43; Gerken, Time for a Détente?, supra note 43. 
143. Young assumes that the federalism revival returns the focus on state 
“sovereignty”. See Young, The Volk of New Jersey?, supra note 6, at 2 (arguing that “ever 
since the Rehnquist Court began reviving the notion of constitutional limitations on 
national power in the early 1990s, American legal scholars have rejoined the age-old 
debate on the relationship between national and state “sovereignty.”). See also Timothy 
Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 233–34 (2005) (discussing 
ideologies of federalism).  
144. See Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 44, at 1698 (associating the idea that 
states and the national government belong to different spheres of authority to pre-New 
Deal Federalism 1.0).  
145. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term, supra note 103, at 16–17 (qualifying 
as “odd” the discussion whether Americans identify with their states). 
146. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 1, at 1108–9 
(criticizing a rigid approach to understanding identity).  
147. See Heather Gerken & Joshua Revesz, Progressive Federalism: A User’s 
Guide, DEMOCRACY JOURNAL (2017), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/progressive-federalism-a-users-guide/ 
[https://perma.cc/SR7P-CAZ9] (archived Dec. 3, 2019) (suggesting progressive federalism 
as an avenue for shaping national policies). 
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branch.”148 This is the key for interpreting recent litigation that states 
introduced against the Trump administration. In the litigation to 
enjoin the first travel ban,149 Washington, Minnesota, and Hawaii 
argued that President Trump violated the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, a federal statute, and that they—the states—were 
defending federal statutes against the executive.150 These are not new 
developments, and Professor Bulman-Pozen documents a similar 
dynamic at work, although with different ideological alignments, in 
litigation that states brought against the Obama and George W. Bush 
administrations.151 However, given the ideological contours of the 
Trump administration and the ever-deeper polarization of American 
politics, it is possible that the new wave of litigation will take these 
litigation efforts to another level. And, at that level, the authority of 
states might call for foundations of the kind that the argument from 
identity can provide. Particularly noteworthy, however, is the role that 
the federal Constitution would play in the state identity. If advocates 
of Federalism 3.0 are correct, and states are sites of national norm 
making, interpreting, and implementing, then state identity might 
bypass the federal government to form a direct, Protestant 
interpretation of the national commitments.152   
 Because the (re)turn to states spans the ideological spectrum, one 
should not believe that the move is postideological. Instead, the path 
to the return is deeply steeped in political ideology on both the left and 
the right. It is just that both sides calculate what they stand to gain 
from using this rhetoric. One need not wait for time to tell which side, 
if any, is correct and who, if any, is miscalculating constitutional 
 
148. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of 
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 488 (2012) (showing that state administration of federal 
law affects the relative power of the executive and Congress).  
149. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order. No. 
13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 
24, 2017). 
150. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The 
New Process Federalism”, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739, 1741, nn.7–9 (2017). Similarly, in 
litigation over stripping funding from “sanctuary cities”, San Francisco argued that “[i]n 
directing that sanctuary jurisdictions are not eligible to receive federal funds, the 
Executive Order asserts legislative power that the Constitution vests exclusively in 
Congress.” Id. at 1741 nn.10–12.  
151. Id. at 1742 (documenting suits brought by states seeking to invalidate, under 
the Take Care Clause, the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents program (“DAPA”), and against the Obama Administration’s 
Clean Power Plan, as well as states challenging the EPA’s failure under the George W. 
Bush Administration to regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to congressional 
authorization (Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).  
152. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18–51 (1988) (distinguishing 
between Catholic constitutional interpretation, which requires the mediation of an 
authoritative interpreter such as the Supreme Court, and Protestant constitutional 
interpretation, where each subject can interpret the Constitution directly).  
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strategy. It is possible to turn to Europe, and with all due caution, learn 
from its own ongoing experiment with national identity.  
IV. IDENTITY AS DOCTRINE: THE CASE OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISM   
 The move from political safeguard to constitutional doctrine gives 
identity a transformative effect on the institutional architecture and 
the discourse of federalism. In the European experience, identity has 
shown itself as a versatile, flexible and, under certain political 
circumstances, an effective means to undercut federal centralization. 
It has arguably played a role in the self-understanding of European’s 
constitutional project as one informed by a certain set of values. It has 
also undoubtedly played a role in the national resistance to the 
constitutional and political project of European unification. First, this 
Part places the role of identity in the arc of European federalism. 
Secondly, this Part studies developments in the last decade after the 
constitutionalization of identity.  
A. The Origins of Identity  
 It is helpful to start by providing the specific historical and 
jurisprudential contexts in which the function and significance of 
identity must be understood. Supranational centralization is an 
essential element of those contexts. Subpart A.1. presents the 
radicalism of the claims that European constitutionalism, through the 
doctrines of the Court of Justice, made on the legal orders of the 
member states. Subpart A.2. discusses the resistance of national legal 
orders to the supranational claims. While that resistance was initially 
far less significant than mainstream constitutional theory now sees it, 
it nevertheless provides the proper context for the arrival of identity 
on the postwar European legal scene. Subpart A.3. presents that 
arrival in the German legal system, which initially tied resistance to 
European federalism to a duty to protect human rights as part of the 
German constitutional identity. After human rights turned out to be 
too shaky a ground on which to rest that resistance, German 
constitutionalism brought out the big guns: at first, democracy in the 
Maastricht decision and, finally, identity in its pure form in the Lisbon 
decision.   
1. The Structure of European Federalism  
 The nature of the EU is often labeled as sui generis, which puts 
the EU in a category of its own—something less than a state but more 
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than an international organization.153 This conclusion has less to do 
with the nature of the claims that European constitutionalism imposes 
on the legal orders of the member states, which suggests a hierarchical 
structure by and large typical of federations, than it is a statement of 
the overall success or political traction of those claims. The first step is 
to take stock of the claims themselves, made over the course of more 
than six decades by the Court of Justice of the European Union on 
behalf of the EU constitutive treaties. This Article presents the core of 
the process of “constitutionalization,”154 and thus centralization, of the 
Treaty of Rome, as a package sufficiently weighty to explain why Pierre 
Pescatore characterized the process of European legal integration as 
one that “undermines categories of thought which have been settled for 
centuries, overturns deeply-rooted political ideologies and strikes at 
powerfully organized interests.”155 
 The ECJ interpreted the treaty to create a legal order distinct—or 
“autonomous,”156 in the court’s language—from both domestic and 
international legal orders. By marked contrast to international law, 
the effect of the legal norms of this supranational legal order would be 
consistent across the national jurisdictions and subject to the ECJ’s 
interpretative authority. European norms of any rank—treaty or 
legislation—would by themselves be capable of conferring individual 
rights enforceable in national courts. Should conflicts arise between 
 
153. See, e.g., William Phelan, What Is Sui Generis About the European Union? 
Costly International Cooperation in a Self-Contained Regime, 14 INT’L STUD. REV. 367, 
371 (2012). 
154. See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of the Transnational 
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (1981) (arguing that a constitutionalist framework 
explains the early decisions interpreting the Treaty of Rome); Joseph Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2425–26 (1991) (describing the 
constitutional interpretations of the Treaty of Rome). For evaluation, see Morten 
Rasmussen, Revolutionizing EU Law: A History of the Van Gend en Loos Judgment, 12 
INT’L J CONST. L. 136, 140 (2014) (calling the constitutionalization of the Treaty a 
“decisive turning point in the history of the European Court of Justice and of EU law in 
general”). For a recent critique of the process of constitutionalization, see Peter Lindseth, 
The Perils of As-If Constitutionalism, 22 EUR. L.J. 696 (2018); Morten Rasmussen & 
Dorte Martinsen, EU Constitutionalization Revisited: Redressing a Central Assumption 
in European Studies, 25 EUR. L.J. 251 (2019). For a study of EU constitutionalization in 
the history of ideas, see Daniel Halberstam, Joseph Weiler, Eric Stein, and the 
Transformation of Constitutional Law, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE: TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS ON 219 (Miguel Maduro & Marlene Wind eds., 2017). 
155. PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION 4 (Christopher Dwyer trans., 
1974). In the same spirit, Walter Hallstein, jurist and president of the European 
Commission, wrote in 1962 that the decisions of the European Court of Justice 
represented the “apex of the Community so far.” He deemed “the importance of the legal 
developments” as “the greatest thus far.” WALTER HALLSTEIN, UNITED EUROPE 35, 37 
(1962). 
156. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 
1963 E.C.R. 1. 
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European and domestic norms, the former would prevail.157 As a 
jurisdictional implication of this priority rule, national judges, acting 
in their superseding authority as European courts,158 could “set 
aside”159 or disapply conflicting domestic norms even when—as was 
virtually always the case—they lacked such authority under their 
national constitutions.160 Conversely, only the ECJ could invalidate 
European legislation.161 Complex doctrines were built on these 
foundations, including jurisdictional rules regarding the obligation of 
national judges to refer questions up to the ECJ to the availability of 
effective national remedies for violations of EU law, the duty to make 
interim relief available, and the duty to guarantee the integrity of the 
EU process by raising sua sponte questions of European law.162 Later, 
the ECJ would accept the corollary of this approach—that member 
states can be held liable in tort under EU law for failure to send 
preliminary references to Luxembourg.163 
 In one of its early foundational statements, the ECJ held that “[b]y 
contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC treaty has 
created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, 
became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and 
which their courts are bound to apply.”164 It has long been a matter of 
controversy how to understand the normative interface between the 
national and the supranational legal orders. In one view, European 
integration is best understood as a form of complex coordination.165 
Each legal order—national and supranational—exists alongside one 
another in heterarchical relations that European constitutional theory 
 
157. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 599–600 
(holding that certain Articles in the EEC Treaty do create individual rights which 
domestic courts are obligated to protect). 
158. Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R II-309, II-364, ¶ 
42 (“[W]hen applying [Community law], the national courts are acting as Community 
courts of general jurisdiction.”). 
159. Case 106/77, Italian Minister of Finance v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629, 638. 
160. Judicial review in many European legal systems is centralized, in the sense 
that only one constitutional court can review constitutional challenges to the validity of 
legislation. See generally VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND 
DEMOCRATIC VALUES (2009).  
161. Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] E.C.R. 4199.  
162. See, e.g., Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte 
Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. I-2433, I-2473-74, ¶¶ 20–23 (explaining the duty to address 
issues of international law which are implicated). 
163. Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-10239, I-10331. For a fuller 
description of these doctrinal developments, see Vlad Perju, On the (De-)Fragmentation 
of Statehood in Europe: Reflections on Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde's Work on European 
Integration, 19 GERMAN L.J. 403, 411 (2018). 
164. Case 6/64, Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593. 
165. See Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993) 
(arguing that “the European Communities . . . constitute a legal order co-ordinate with 
that of the Member States.”).  
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has spent decades trying to theorize.166 An alternative view sees 
European integration as a form of unification or fusion which, for all 
the complexity of the resulting legal order, nevertheless meets the 
criteria of vertical, hierarchical integration. Coordination is not 
excluded from this latter model but by itself it does not capture the 
originality and radicalism of European constitutionalism.  
 The radicalism of European constitutionalism stems from the 
closer alignment of the ECJ with the fusion or unification model of 
European integration. A compelling argument to that effect goes 
beyond the aim of this Article. It suffices for the present purpose to 
point to the core doctrines of autonomy and supremacy, which, in the 
court’s jurisprudence, form the unitary foundations of European 
constitutionalism. Autonomy entails that courts may not tie the effect 
of European norms within their jurisdictions to municipal rules, 
including rules of constitutional rank, that determine the domestic 
effect of international legal norms. Irrespective of whether national 
legal orders are monist or dualist in regard to how the domestic legal 
orders relate to international law, the imperatives of systemic unity 
demand the centralization of decisions regarding the effect of EU 
norms to the supranational level. And once the decision to centralize is 
interpreted as deriving from the treaty itself, which is a source of law 
independent of the decisions of its signatories or of their legal order, 
the autonomy of the European legal order becomes immunized and 
secure.  
 The consolidation of the authority of European law has been a long 
process and remains ongoing. An important part of that process has 
been a defense of its legality, that is, of the claim to autonomy of the 
European legal order qua legal order. This explains, for instance, the 
recurrent and tantalizingly tautological deployment of the 
effectiveness rationale in the formative decisions of European 
constitutionalism.167 Since effectiveness is a necessary, albeit hardly 
sufficient, condition of legality, concerns about the former are 
understandably heightened in legal orders that are at early stages of 
development. In the specifically European supranational context, 
effectiveness is a function of the uniformity of interpretation and 
implementation across domestic jurisdictions. The core idea is that the 
legal effect of European legal norms cannot depend on the different 
traditions and structures of municipal jurisdictions, or even more 
 
166. KLEMEN JAKLIČ, CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EU 3 (2013) (describing 
constitutional pluralism as the dominant branch of European constitutional theory). 
167. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594 (“[T]he law stemming from the treaty, an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its 
character as community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being 
called into question.”).  
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questionably, on the political interests du jour.168 Centralization thus 
reflects the constitutional demands of a political project not guided by 
“the laws of expediency [but one that] should be built upon a more 
permanent and objective foundation.”169 
2. Reciprocal Supremacy  
 The supremacy doctrine is central to the constitutional project of 
supranational centralization. Supremacy, according to the ECJ, is the 
normative implication of the autonomy of the European legal order.170 
From the “praetorian”171 holding in Costa regarding, to the absolute 
 
168. The ECJ held  that “[t]he obligations undertaken under the treaty 
establishing the Community would not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they 
could be called in question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories.” Id. But, as 
far as international law is concerned, the issue has its own complexities. The Permanent 
Court of International Justice had held that municipal norms, including norms of 
constitutional rank, could not be invoked to bar or otherwise limit that effect of 
international law. Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
B) No. 11 (May 16). Expanding on this analysis, Derrick Wyatt argued a few decades ago 
that much of what the ECJ  sought out to do in Van Gend could already be accomplished 
under international law. Derrick Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147, 
148 (1982); see also Bruno de Witte, Retour à “Costa”: La primaute du droit 
communautaire a la lumiere du droit international, 20 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
EUROPEEN 425 (1984). 
169. ANDRE M. DONNER, THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 59 
(1968). This is not to deny that, conceptually speaking, coordination rationale can be 
sufficient to explain supranational centralization. In the case of European legal 
integration, such an account would envisage successive spill-over processes set and kept 
in motion by the need for ever more perfect coordination between municipal jurisdictions. 
But, as Donner suggests, that process would not rest on “permanent and objective 
foundation.” Id. Even aside from close association between the logic of coordination and 
international law, one insuperable difficulty of understanding integration as an ever-
perfectible process of coordination is that, by itself such a process is aimless. What gives 
it direction is an understanding of its purpose, be that pacification, prosperity and/or the 
full axiological panoply of collective self-government: equality, liberty, and solidarity. For 
a study, see Dimitry Kochenov, The Ought of Justice, in EUROPE’S JUSTICE DEFICIT 
(Dimitry Kochenov et al. eds., 2015); Pierre Pescatore, L’objectif de la Communauté 
Européene comme principes d’interpretation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice, 
in MISCELLANEA W.J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH 325–63 (2d ed. 1972). 
170. Once the Luxembourg judges settled the difficult question of autonomy of the 
autonomy of the European legal order, and did so specifically on the grounds laid out in 
Van Gend, the extension to supremacy of European over municipal norms is a small 
conceptual, albeit not political, step. See Editorial, For History's Sake: On Costa v. 
ENEL, André Donner and the Eternal Secret of the Court of Justice's Deliberations, 10 
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 191, 195 n.12 (2014) (relying on circumstantial evidence to argue 
that the Costa decision was unanimous, by contrast to Van Gend, which was decided by 
the narrowest of margins (four to three votes)).  
171. See Philippe Manin, The Nicolo Case of the Conseil d‘Etat: French 
Constitutional Law and the Supreme Administrative Court’s Acceptance of the Primacy 
of Community Law over Subsequent National Statute Law, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
499, 511 (1991) (discussing Patrick Frydman’s Nicolo submission as Commissaire du 
Gouvernment in that case). 
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supremacy of EU law and the working out of its jurisdictional 
implications,172 to its recent expansion in Melloni of the charter’s 
primacy over national law,173 the ECJ has been highly protective of its 
capacity to control the relation between national and European legal 
orders. The Luxembourg judges have reasserted and refined the 
supremacy of the EU Treaty and have drawn out its bold jurisdictional 
and institutional implications.174  
 How national apex courts have reacted to the ECJ’s 
constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome, and specifically to the 
supremacy holdings, is critical for understanding the origins of identity 
federalism in the EU. National courts are typically seen as resistant to 
the ECJ’s claims, and often willing to offer counterclaims grounded in 
their own national legal orders.175 The national challenge to the 
supremacy of European law and the primacy of its norms to those 
originating in domestic legal orders takes the form of a theoretical 
account about dual, or reciprocal, supremacy. The gist of this view is 
that, by virtue of the limited constitutional and institutional capacities 
of the EU, only the cooperation or acceptance of national constitutional 
guardians can give EU law “an impact on legal reality.”176 The “full 
 
172. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA 
1978 E.C.R. 630, 644, ¶ 21 (“Every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, 
apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on 
individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may 
conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.”). 
173. E.C.J. Case C‑399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, 2013 E.C.R. 1 
(holding that the primacy of the Treaty involves obligation on national courts to set aside 
national law even when European norm is not directly effective). For analysis, see 
Leonard F.M. Besselink, The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict After Melloni, 39 
EUR. L. REV. 531 (2014).  
174. In recent cases, the ECJ has found itself in a position to balance, and 
occasionally constrain, its supremacy claims as it comes into conflict with other 
fundamental principles such legal certainty. See E.C.J. Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten 
v. Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, 2010 E.C.R. ¶ 67 (allowing national legislation 
to stand, exceptionally and for overriding considerations of legal certainty, grant a 
provisional suspension of the usual effect which EU law has on conflicting national law). 
On prevention of retroactivity given considerations of legal certainty, see E.C.J. Case C-
25/14, UNIS v. SNRT, 2015 ¶51 (public procurement contracts can be executed even if 
violate EU law)); res judicata (E.C.J. Impresa Pizzarotti, Case C-213/13, Impresa 
Pizzarotti & C. SpA v. Comune di Bari, EU:C:2014:2067, ¶¶ 58–59; see also E.C.J. Case 
C-379/15, Association France Nature Environment v. Premier ministre and Ministre de 
l’Écologie, du Développement durable et de l’Énergie, EU:C:2016:603 (July 28, 2016). In 
most of these cases, the ECJ mediated balancing between two principles with different 
pedigree—national and supranational—but is rather internal to EU law. See Katy 
Sowery, Reconciling Primacy and Environmental Protection: Association France Nature 
Environment, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1164 (2017). 
175. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has held that Polish law trumps EU law, 
and threatened to use the ultra vires doctrine in preserving the ability of the “Republic 
of Poland to continue functioning as a sovereign and democratic state.” TK (Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal) May 11, 2005, Case 18/04, ¶ 11 (Pol.). 
176. Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the European Legal 
Order, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 323, 346 (Gráinne de Búrca & Paul P. Craig eds., 
2020] IDENTITY FEDERALISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 239 
 
reception” of EU law thus “depends on its incorporation into the 
constitutional orders of the Member States and its affirmation by their 
supreme courts.”177 While the ECJ and national apex courts both claim 
ultimate authority, neither claim by itself captures the nature of 
constitutional authority within the EU; only both perspectives, in 
tandem, do. The reception into national law of the ECJ’s supremacy 
doctrine, according to such a view, is not exogenous to the supremacy 
doctrine; rather, it becomes a constitutive part of the doctrine itself.178 
EU supremacy is “necessarily bi-dimensional”179 in the sense that it is 
co-constituted by two perspectives, each originating from within legal 
orders that make mutually incompatible claims on one another. 
According to this account, the ECJ’s supremacy holdings stand neither 
higher nor lower but alongside and on an equal plane with the 
doctrines of national courts that incorporate—or not—the 
supranational doctrine into the constitutional orders of the several 
member states.180  
 The ensuing account is one of integration as coordination, not 
fusion.181 Recent scholarship has attempted to back up this account 
with a historical narrative.182 The assertiveness of the Court of Justice 
is portrayed here as an instance of judicial activism. Rather than the 
much-needed textual anchor for the court’s constitutional revolution, 
the Treaty of Rome is seen as a “fundamentally ambiguous”183 text that 
 
2011) (“There is a second dimension to the [primacy] matter, which is decisive for 
determining whether the Court’s doctrines have an impact on legal reality: the attitude 
of national courts and other institutions.”). See also Weiler, supra note 35, at 13 (“[B]oth 
in fact and in law, ultimate authority still rests in national constitutional orders which 
sanction supremacy, define its parameters, and typically place limitations on it.”). 
177. Joseph Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of 
Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267, 275–76 (1982) [hereinafter Weiler, The 
Community System]. 
178. For a critical discussion, see Vlad Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in 
EU Constitutionalism (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
179. Weiler, The Community System, supra note 177, at 275. 
180. See also Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 EUR. 
L.J. (1995) 259, 264 (commenting that the relations between the national and 
supranational legal orders does not have “any all-purpose superiority of one system over 
another.”). 
181. See id. at 263–64 (“Once we have established this doctrine of the supremacy 
of Community law, however, the question inevitably to be posed is whether there is any 
need at all for an elaborate theory about interaction of distinct systems. If system X 
enjoys supremacy over system Y, why trouble to have a theory about separate systems, 
rather than a theory which acknowledges the fact that Y belongs to X as subsystem of 
it?”). 
182. See, e.g., Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization. Van 
Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1 (2010). 
183. See Morten Rasmussen, Revolutionizing European Law: A History of the Van 
Gend en Loos Judgment, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 136, 145 (2014) [hereinafter Rasmussen, 
Revolutionizing European Law]. A useful study is Morten Rasmussen, The Origins of a 
Legal Revolution—the Early History of the European Court of Justice, 14 J. EUR. 
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could not offer the needed textual grounding for the court’s 
constitutional revolution. The treaty was negotiated with due 
realpolitik alertness to the challenges of gaining ratification in 
national legislatures, in the aftermath of failures to expand the 
institutional architecture of the early European Coal and Steel 
Community in the direction of either a defense or of a full-blown 
political community.184 Accordingly, the Treaty of Rome is said to have 
taken the supranational political construct away from the goal of 
unification and toward enhancing the role of states in the institutional 
architecture of the Common Market.185 Its constitutionalization was 
the work of jurists—a “little group of entrepreneurs”186 —that hijacked 
with impunity the political project of the six signatory states—France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries—disregarding their 
intentions and departing from the letter and, importantly, the spirit of 
their agreed-upon text.187 The act of hijacking itself is said to have been 
quite elaborate, with the grand decisions of the ECJ playing an 
important, if somewhat limited, role.188 In one elaborate version of this 
account, the court’s foundational decisions were “empty vessels”189 that 
turned into grand political moments through complex processes of 
meaning-ascription staged and executed by a network of self-
interested, European-minded jurists.190  
 The soundness of this criticism is open to debate. It seems at best 
an exaggeration to portray the Treaty of Rome as a fundamentally 
ambiguous step in the direction of integration. While it may be true 
that the treaty diluted compliance mechanisms by states with their 
community obligations that existed in the Treaty of Paris establishing 
 
INTEGRATION HIST. 77 (2008) [hereinafter Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal 
Revolution].  
184. Id. 
185. Evidence for this claim is given in the form of the weakening of supranational 
institutions, especially the Commission and the Court of Justice, and the greater 
legislative powers, including the veto, given to states as represented in the Council of 
Ministers. See LEVINSON, supra note 152.  
186. Antoine Vauchez, Integration Through Law: Contribution to a Socio-history 
of EU Political Commonsense 12 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 10, 2008).  
187. See, e.g., Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of EU Law, 
1950-1957: The Legal History of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 
339, 340 (2012) (arguing that “a small number of politicians and jurists managed to 
insert the potential for constitutional practice into the treaties despite the conscious 
attempt by the majority of the governments not to establish a European constitutional 
order.”). In this context, it is worth remembering that, in the large majority of cases, 
subsequent treaties ratified the decisions of the court by incorporating them into the text 
of the revised treaties.  
188. See generally Vauchez, supra note 186.  
189. Id. at 9. 
190. See Rasmussen, Revolutionizing European Law, supra note 183, at 137 
(calling Van Gend “a focal point for a rich patchwork of constantly reproduced historical 
memory and myths used for ideological purposes”). 
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the European Coal and Steel Community,191 it is also the case that, in 
important respects, Rome strengthened supranational institutions. 
Pointing to its much-analyzed preamble is sure to draw the ire of 
commentators who see such textualism as narrow, legalistic 
approaches, yet anyone with passing knowledge of treaty negotiation 
knows that such language is the outcome of protracted negotiation and 
ought not be dismissed as weightless pamphlets.192 More 
substantively, the rejection of proposals to replace the ECJ with an ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal combined with the strengthening of the court’s 
preliminary reference jurisdiction in the interpretation of norms were 
deeply consequential. The relatively open-ended delineation of 
competencies between states and the community enabled the 
commission to expand the jurisdiction of the community 
considerably.193 
 The trope about the hijacked treaty is similarly quite 
unconvincing. It is true that the received wisdom has long been that 
the court’s bold early doctrines were developed in splendid isolation  
from public opinion.194 The implication of that view is that only in such 
a setting, and hiding behind the cover of the highly technical nature of 
its cases that could never appeal to the larger public or even the 
informed if busy national politician, could the ECJ constitutionalize 
the Treaty of Rome. The day of reckoning would thus inevitably come, 
 
191. The infringement procedure, the main legal tool for securing compliance from 
states, was weakened because the ECJ could no longer levy fines. Compare Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 169–171, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], with Treaty Establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community, art. 44, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC 
Treaty]. In addition, infringement proceedings started by the Commission were 
lengthened, a two-step process. Similarly, the Treaty limited standing for private 
litigants in the Court of Justice, which modified the institutional architecture of the 
ECSC. This was done by “by blurring the distinction between decisions directed towards 
a particular firm and general decisions and acts.” See Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal 
Revolution, supra note 183, at 85. The relevant cases are Case 3/54, Associazione 
Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v. High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, 1955 E.C.R. 63; Case 4/54, Industrie Siderurgiche Associate (ISA) v. 
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1955 E.C.R. 91. 
192. The oft-cited Preamble of the Treaty of Rome starts by “DETERMINED to lay 
the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.” Treaty of Rome. 
For analysis, see Joseph Weiler, Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: An 
Exploratory Essay, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 678, 689 (2011).  
193. The Court of Justice obliged, not striking down any piece of Community 
legislation as ultra vires for the first four decades of European integration. See also 
Tobacco Advertisement cases in the 1990s. For analysis, see generally Democracy and 
Constitutionalism in the European Union: Collected Essays (Federico Mancini ed., 
2000).  
194. See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational 
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1981) (“Tucked away in the fairyland 
Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that 
be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned 
a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure.”). 
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in this view, when the court’s work would be brought into the light—
and rejected. In reality, however, things were much more nuanced. 
European constitutional integration was hardly the pet project of a 
handful of sectarian jurists.195 Connections between, on the one hand, 
the ECJ, and, on the other hand, wide networks of jurists across the 
continent prove that supranational constitutionalization did have roots 
in the legal traditions of the member states.196 While actual litigation 
in Luxembourg was indeed the work of a number of repeat players, the 
doctrines and legal strategies were not alien to legal thought and the 
legal profession.197  
 While the conventional view of the early development of European 
constitutionalism needs revisiting, it nevertheless provides the context 
for understanding what one might call the dual structure of European 
constitutionalism. In addition to Luxembourg’s holdings, that dual 
structure includes the resistance those doctrines supposedly 
encountered when they came into contact with national doctrines and 
national legal establishments.198 The claims of EU supremacy met, in 
this account, with the counterclaims originating in the national legal 
orders. As Karen Alter sums up this view, “the ECJ can say whatever 
it wants, the real question is why anyone should heed it.”199 Thus, 
whatever domestic traction the supremacy claim might have within 
national legal systems, its explanation is not reducible to the ECJ’s 
pronouncement. The sources of such traction must, rather, be sought 
in the reaction of national legal orders. And, from that national 
perspective, European supremacy has an additional, or second, 
dimension, “which is decisive for determining whether the Court’s 
doctrines have an impact on legal reality: the attitude of national 
 
195. See, e.g., Alexandre Bernier, Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational 
Jurist Networks and the Making of a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 21 
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 399 (2012).  
196. For the particular—and not entirely surprising—case of the Netherlands, see 
Jieskje Hollander, The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948–
present). On Teachings and Life, 17 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 197, 201 (2011) 
(describing “the choice between unifying Europe in a federation or remaining an order of 
nation states” as one “between life or death, or freedom and slavery”). 
197. For the role of Europeanization beyond the legal profession to social 
movements, see LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 3 (2002). I study this phenomenon in the context of disability rights movement in 
Vlad Perju, Impairment, Discrimination and the Legal Construction of Disability in the 
European Union and the United States, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279 (2011). 
198. For a study, see Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU 
Constitutionalism, supra note 178. 
199. Karen Alter, The European Court’s Political Power: the Emergence of an 
Authoritative International Court in the European Union, 19 WEST EUR. POL. 458, 459 
(1996).  
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courts and other institutions.”200 The dual structure of European 
constitutionalism informs an account of reciprocal supremacy. 
 Focusing on the initial encounter, generations of EU scholars have 
answered that question by pointing out that resistance characterized 
the reactions of national legal orders through their apex courts.201 A 
number of canonical judgments—Semoules,202 Solange I,203 Cohn-
Bendit,204 contro-limiti,205 Maastricht,206 Lisbon207 or the Polish 
Accession Judgment208—have been offered as evidence of national 
resistance to the ECJ’s claim of absolute and unconditional supremacy 
of EU law. When member states recognized the primacy of EU law, 
they did it, with few exceptions,209 by using their national constitutions 
rather than the EU doctrine as the basis for such limited recognition. 
Whether it was Article 11 of the Italian Constitution, the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom, Article 24(1) of the 
German Basic Law, Article 55 of the French Constitution, or Article 93 
of the Spanish Constitution, acceptance of EU primacy rarely if ever 
 
200. de Witte, supra note 176, at 346; see also Weiler, supra note 35, at 13 (“both 
in fact and in law, ultimate authority still rests in national constitutional orders which 
sanction supremacy, define its parameters, and typically place limitations on it.”). 
201. As Neil Walker correctly pointed out, there is wide agreement on the 
descriptive basis of constitutional pluralism. Yet agreement on those bases push the 
normative analysis in the direction of pluralism. See Neil Walker, Constitutional 
Pluralism Revisited, 22 EUR. L.J. 333, 346 n.46. For a challenge to that consensus, see 
Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU Constitutionalism, supra note 178. 
202. Conseil d’Etat, 1 Mar. 1968, Syndicat Général de Fabricants de Semoules de 
France (1970) CMLR 395 (Fr.). 
203. German Federal Constitutional Court, May 29, 1974, Solange I - 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft von Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und. 
Futtermittel, BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974]  
204. Conseil d’Etat Dec. 22, 1978, Case Ministre de l'intérieur c. Cohn-Bendit (Fr.).  
205. (Corte Cost.) (Constitutional Court) Dec. 18, 1973, Judgment 183 Frontini v 
Ministero delle Finanze (It.). 
206. German Federal Constitutional Court, Oct. 12, 1993, Maastricht, BVerfGE 
89, 155; German Federal Constitutional Court, Oct. 12, 1993, Brunner v. European 
Union Treaty, 1994 1 CMLR 57. 
207. German Federal Constitutional Court, June 30, 2009, Lisbon Treaty 
Constitutionality Case, BVerfGE (2009). 
208. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) May 11, 2005, Case no. 18/04 (Accession 
Treaty). 
209. For instance, of the original six member states, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands seem to have acknowledged that authority on the same basis as the ECJ’s 
Costa jurisprudence. See George Thill, La primaute et l’effet direct du droit 
communautaire dans la jurisprudence luxembourgoise, 6 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF 978 (1990). For case law, see Cour de Cassation July 14, 1954; Conseil 
d’Etat Nov. 21, 1984, Bellion et al. v. Minister for the Civil Service (Fr.). For the 
Netherlands, see Alfred Kellermann, Supremacy of Community law in the Netherlands, 
14 EUR. L. REV. 175 (1989). At the same time, the national constitutional text 
unsurprisingly played a role in Luxembourg and Netherlands. It was the text that 
enabled the courts to issue the decisions they did.  
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rested upon Costa itself.210 Even after some of the original 
constitutional anchors metamorphosed into provisions specifically 
dealing with EU membership, national courts rejected absolute and 
unconditional supremacy in favor of a relative and conditional 
acceptance.211 As a matter of EU doctrine, using international law to 
frame the national reception of the European legal order was in and of 
itself contrary to the ECJ’s interpretation that the treaty is an 
independent and original source of law which forms a legal order that 
is autonomous from international law.212 Thus, resting the authority 
of EU law on national constitutional text, rather than the EU Treaty, 
is interpreted as a rejection of Costa’s claim to unconditional and 
absolute supremacy of supranational norms.  
 It goes beyond the scope of this Article to undergo a complete 
assessment of this conventional account of reciprocal supremacy.213 
This Article only suggests here that the view according to which 
national resistance was inevitable given the radical claims of European 
constitutionalism, is far from self-evident. In a different interpretation, 
the reception of EU law, including its supremacy claims, into national 
legal orders was far less resistant. Grounding acceptance on the 
national constitution, as opposed to EU doctrine, was far from 
unreasonable. Neither was, in fact, the analogy between European and 
international law. Not only should one expect national courts to refer 
to international law, which is technically correct since the Treaty of 
Rome was, after all, an international treaty, but one should also expect 
national judges to use the doctrines of the ECJ strategically, at least 
in legal systems where there existed long-simmering doctrinal debates 
about the place of international law.214 It is perfectly understandable 
that national legal systems would use the closest available anchor to 
process the claims of the ECJ. This is true across jurisdictions. In 
Belgium, for example, where jurists contemplated a constitutional 
amendment to change an “exceptionally retrograde”215 model that 
 
210. There are exceptions. One is Luxembourg. See Thill, La primaute, supra note 
209. See also Cour de Cassation July 14, 1954; Conseil d’Etat Nov. 21, 1984, Bellion et 
al. v. Minister for the Civil Service. The second exception is the Netherlands. See 
Kellermann, supra note 209, at 177.  
211. This is Germany. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][ Federal 
Constitutional Court] Oct. 12 1993, MAASTRICHT 89, 155 (Ger.). 
212. I use international law in the general sense. For a suggestion that 
international law should rather be understood in the narrower sense of peremptory 
norms (jus cogens), and a schematic account of possible implications, see Henry G. 
Schermers, The Scale in Balance: National Constitutional Courts v. The Court of Justice, 
27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 97, 98 (1990). 
213. See Perju, Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU Constitutionalism, supra 
note 178. 
214. See Manin, supra note 171, at 511.  
215. See Case Note, Conflicts between Treaties and Subsequently Enacted Statutes 
in Belgium: Etat Belge v. S.A. “Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le Ski”, 72 MICH. L. REV. 118, 
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allowed later-in-time legislation to trump international law, national 
courts used the opportunity of EU law to reverse that system and, 
while referring to the Costa rationale, grounded their holding in the 
“very nature of international treaty law.”216 In France, positioning in 
relation to the EU  became part of simmering conflicts between the two 
supreme courts, Conseil d’Etat and Court de cassation, on the “correct” 
interpretation of Article 55 of the French Constitution.217 It revealed 
deep divisions on the question of the powers of the executive, 
legislative, and the judiciary in interpreting international treaties 
under the constitutional architecture of the French Fifth Republic.218   
 Unsurprisingly, it was not Costa itself as much as the national 
judges’ vision of their own role that shaped the terms of national 
reception, more so at the moment of first impact than later.219 For, 
again as one would expect, the vision and doctrines of national apex 
courts evolved in time. When, two decades after it rejected the 
supremacy of EU law in the Nicolo judgment, the French supreme 
administrative court reversed that decision,220 that reversal could be 
seen in no other way than as “a full-blown success for European 
integration through law.”221 That reversal, like the earlier recognition 
 
120 (1973) (illustrating the Belgian legal tradition of giving effect to subsequent national 
laws over earlier treaties in the case of conflicts between the two).  
216. See id. (analyzing the Belgian judiciary’s establishment of treaty preeminence 
over national law). 
217. 1958 CONST. 55; see CE Sect., Mar. 1, 1968, 62814, Rec. Lebon 149 (Fr.) 
(denying the supremacy of a treaty over a subsequent conflicting national law); see also 
Gerald L. Neuman, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 306 (noting that the Conseil d’Etat and 
the Cour de cassation disagreed over whether later statutes superseded earlier treaties). 
218. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Oct. 
27, 1970, Gaz. Pal. 1970, 90, 6–7 (Fr.) (advancing a more favorable stand than Conseil 
d’Etat towards European Law, even though again Article 55 of the constitution serves as 
the legal basis); see also Gerhard Bebr, How Supreme is Community Law in the National 
Courts?, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 3, 8 (1974) (“Under the French legal system, only the 
executive may interpret public international treaties. Such an interpretation may 
already implicitly predetermine the solution of the conduct between an international 
treaty and a municipal law. This practice may not be particularly conducive for French 
courts to develop a judicial policy ensuring the supremacy of international treaties. This 
may in turn have some effect on the attitude of French courts towards Community Law”). 
219. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 (asserting the 
supremacy of European Economic Community law); see generally THE EUROPEAN COURT 
AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE & JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 
1998). 
220. The French Conseil d’Etat signaled it might reverse its stance as early as 
1986, in Smanor, and followed through in 1990, Nicolo. See CE, Nov. 19, 1986, 41852 
45416, Rec. Lebon; CE Ass., Oct. 20 1989, 108243, Rec. Lebon. The ground for acceptance 
of EU law is Art. 55 of French Constitution, not the reasoning of the ECJ about specificity 
of EU law. By contrast to 1975 decision of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, which 
based its decision on both Art. 55 and Costa. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] 
[Constitutional Court] Decision No. 74-54DC, Jan. 15, 1975, Rec. 19 (Fr.). 
221. Jens Plötner, Report on France, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL 
COURTS: DOCTRINE & JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 219, at 41, 48. 
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of EU authority in the constitutional context,222 rested both on the 
provisions of the French constitution and on the acceptance of Costa, 
alongside the national constitution, at the basis of EU supremacy.223 
The available constitutional text, the nature of the ongoing doctrinal 
and jurisprudential debates, and, importantly, the sheer magnitude of 
the ECJ’s claims and novelty of the situation into which they threw 
national courts—and at times even the ECJ itself224—provide an 
explanation for those references. It would be the height of formalism to 
abstract them entirely from their context and interpret them as a 
rejection of Costa and of the absolute supremacy of EU law. 
 This radical claim of European constitutionalism, on the one hand, 
and the complex counterreactions of national courts, some of them 
amplified ex post, on the other hand, provide the origins of identity 
federalism in the EU. For, as shown in the next subpart, identity 
provided from the beginning a purportedly principled ground and 
malleable cover for resisting European integration. Some of this 
resistance was, in the abstract, legitimate. National legal orders were 
concerned that supranational norms did not provide sufficient 
protections to either the constitutionalist (fundamental rights) or the 
democratic guarantees of their own domestic legal orders. Yet, identity 
became a useful cover behind which constitutional nationalism could 
hide itself until it could emerge in full view in prime time.  
B. Identity and Human Rights   
 The early history of identity federalism’s entrance in European 
constitutionalism is German through and through.225 It was in a 
decision from Karlsruhe that identity made its first—notably 
 
222. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] ch. mixte, 
May 24, 1975, Bull. civ., No. 4 (Fr.) (holding that a European Economic Community 
treaty had greater authority than a municipal law under Article 55 of the French 
Constitution). 
223. In that case, Attorney-General Touffait asked the Court to hold EU 
supremacy on the basis of ECJ doctrine in Costa, not Article 55. The Court chose both 
Article 55 and Costa’s reasoning, and recast the conflict as internal to French law: as 
between legislatively implementing the international law, and maintaining the 
statutory norm. See Plötner, supra note 221, at 45. 
224. In Van Gend, the ECJ referred to the European legal order as a new legal 
order “of international law.” The international law qualification was dropped in 
subsequent cases. See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport–en Expeditie Onderneming 
van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 
(establishing that domestic courts must recognize and enforce certain rights conferred 
by EU law). 
225. See generally Polzin, supra note 65 (discussing the evolution of constitutional 
identity in Germany).  
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subdued—appearance.226 In Solange 1 [1974],227 the German 
Constitutional Court subscribed to the ECJ’s view that the European 
legal order “forms an independent system of law flowing from an 
autonomous legal source.”228 What it did reject was the ECJ’s claim to 
the supremacy of EU law in Costa.229 Specifically, the constitutional 
judges held that, when conflicts arise between European secondary 
legislation and the human rights provisions of the German Basic Law, 
national judges retained “the right to review the validity of the 
Community legislation—that is, to render it without effect within the 
jurisdiction it controls.”230 The grounds for that right, and for the 
national resistance to Costa, were to be found in human rights.231 The 
German court was concerned about the missing human rights 
guarantees at the European level equivalent to those afforded under 
the Basic Law.232 If European law recognized the supremacy that 
Costa claims it has over national law, and if European law offers no 
protection to human rights,233 the fundamental rights that the Basic 
Law recognizes to its subjects could conceivably be violated with 
impunity. The upshot is that it is not the European doctrine of 
supremacy, as articulated by the ECJ, that determines the effect of 
European legal norms in cases of their potential conflict with human 
rights norms, but rather the independent assessment of national 
courts, making their decisions on the basis of a feature—human 
rights—they deem essential for national and supranational legal 
orders alike. 
 Solange I presents the protection of human rights as an 
“inalienable, essential feature”234 of the German constitutional order. 
Famously, the German Basic Law makes the right to dignity and the 
 
226. For further discussion, see Vlad Perju, On Uses and Misuses of Human Rights 
in European Constitutionalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND LEGITIMACY IN A 
WORLD OF DISORDER 263, 268–74 (Silja Voeneky & Gerald L. Neuman eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter Perju, Uses and Misuses].  
227. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 
1974, 37 Solange I 271 [hereinafter Solange I].  
228. See id. (“[I]n agreement with the law developed by the European Court of 
Justice,” the Court writes, “Community law is neither a component part of the national 
legal system nor international law, but forms an independent system of law flowing from 
an autonomous legal source”); see also Lütticke, 31 BVerfGE 145 (June 9, 1971). 
229. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court, Solange I; see also Case 6/64, 
Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594. 
230. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I. It should be noted 
that such pressure pre-dated Solange I. In a decision from 1966, the German 
Constitutional Court indicated it might have the right to review European legal norms. 
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 16, 1966, 
22 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 293 (298). 
231. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I. 
232. See id. 
233. But see Perju, Uses and Misuses, supra note 226, at 274–80 (arguing that 
human rights are a fundamental part of the European legal order). 
234. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I. 
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democratic nature of the state unamendable.235 As the German judges 
put it, “[t]he part of the Basic Law dealing with fundamental rights is 
an inalienable, essential feature of the valid Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and one which forms part of the constitutional 
structure of the Basic Law.”236 That basic structure forms the basis of 
the “identity” of the Basic Law.237 It thus remained incumbent upon 
the German Constitutional Court to protect the German constitutional 
order by mandating the acceptance of the claim of European 
supremacy in terms that were conditional on the preservation of its 
identity. 
 How do human rights dovetail into an identitarian paradigm? The 
relation certainly has its complexities. While constitutional identity 
develops in time, the passing of time changes identity. At the same 
time, however, identity is also that which cannot change (merely) 
through the passing of time. The German Constitutional Court holds, 
in this context, that fundamental rights represent an aspect of the 
German constitutional identity that cannot and will not be 
surrendered to the supranational level.238 Joseph Weiler provides a 
theoretical account of this complex relation. Fundamental rights, in his 
view, are at the same time fundamental boundaries.239 Boundaries 
here are a “metaphor for the principle of enumerated powers or limited 
competences which are designed to guarantee that in certain areas 
communities (rather than individuals) should be free to make their 
own social choices without interference from above.”240 The EU is the 
“above,” the threat to aspects of identity through which communities 
distinguish themselves from others and, generally, from the outside 
world. Rights are, in Weiler’s account, “both a source of, and index for, 
cross-national differentiation and not only cross-national 
assimilation.”241 They represent core values that are part of self-
understanding—a community’s “particularized identity rooted in 
 
235. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], Art. 1, 20, 79 Abs. 3, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0019 
[https://perma.cc/SQ3G-XTM6] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).  
236. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I. 
237. See id. at [43]. For an argument along similar lines, see Fabbrini & Sajó, supra 
note 11, at 463 (noting that German Constitutional Courts have limited the direct 
application of EU laws when they conflict with fundamental German constitutional 
principles). 
238. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], Art. 79 Abs. 3; see 37 BVerfGE 271.  
239. See JOSEPH WEILER, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On 
the Conflict of Standards and Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the European 
Legal Space, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 102, 106 (1999) (arguing that 
fundamental boundaries and fundamental rights are part of the same societal choice 
between promoting the fundamental right of the individual and the fundamental right 
of the government to act in the general interest). 
240. Id. at 103–04. 
241. Id. at 105. 
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history . . . and political culture.”242 Rights are inherently fragile since 
they are the outcome of clashes of deeply felt values and normative 
projects at the national level. Since “[h]uman rights are almost 
invariably the expression of a compromise between competing social 
goods in the polity,”243 the process of European integration should 
tread carefully so as not to interfere with those constitutional 
accomplishments that everyone with passing knowledge of modern 
history knows to be distressingly fragile.  
 Solange I relied on human rights to contain the vertical 
integration of German constitutional order into European 
federalism.244 The practical effect of those limits was itself quite 
limited.245 For the period of a little over a decade, until the German 
Constitutional Court became satisfied that the European legal order 
had developed protections of human rights that were comparable to 
those afforded under the Basic Law and reversed it,246 Solange I was 
never applied as ground for nullifying the legal effect of European 
secondary legislation in Germany.247 And it may well be that its 
limited practical role was part of the reason for the subsequent 
radicalization of German constitutional resistance to the project of 
European unification. After all, Solange I had acquiesced to the ECJ’s 
holding of the Treaty of Rome as an independent source of law.248 Seen 
from the perspective of the search for effective tools to resist European 
integration, Solange I was in a sense only a half measure. Particularly 
effective opposition to European integration required taking the ECJ 
 
242. Id. 
243. See id. at 106. 
244. [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I. 
245. At least so long as that effect is measured in application of the doctrine in 
subsequent case-law. More difficult to gauge is its impact on the landscape of European 
constitutionalism as a mere “law in the books.” The German Constitutional Court took 
credit in Solange II for this development at the European level, although its self-serving 
congratulatory mood should be viewed with skepticism. See G. Federico Mancini & David 
T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 187 
(1994) (“It would be an exaggeration to say that the European Court was bulldozed into 
protecting fundamental rights by rebellious national courts.”). It is also worth recalling 
that Solange I was met, both domestically and in Europe, with dismay and 
disparagement. See Hans Peter-Ipsen, BVerfG versus EuGH re “Grundrechte”, 10 
EUROPARECHT 1 (1975) (arguing that Solange I was “wrong . . . fallacious, superfluous, 
and legally-politically mistaken . . . [and] groundless.”). 
246. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 
22, 1986, 73 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 339. 
247. For a watering-down of the doctrine, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] July 25, 1979, 52 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 187. 
248. See [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Solange I (“[I]n agreement with 
the law developed by the European Court of Justice, [the German court] adheres to its 
settled view that Community law is neither a component part of the national legal 
system nor international law, but forms an independent system of law flowing from an 
autonomous legal source.”).  
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seriously that autonomy and supremacy are the double helix of 
European constitutionalism—only to then reject them both.249 
Interestingly, for the purpose of this Article, the search for a more 
effective strategy did not require abandoning the role of identity. If 
anything, it meant bringing identity more prominently into the 
foreground of national constitutional resistance.  
 In the Maastricht decision, the German judges rejected the claim 
to autonomy of the European legal order and European 
constitutionalism wholesale.250 The German court moved from human 
rights to democracy, and the related interpretation of limited, 
conferred powers from the member states to the EU, as the grounds of 
its resistance to supranational, European law. The German judges held 
that the imperative of democratic self-government, also an 
unamendable constitutional provision and implicitly part of German 
constitutional identity,251 provided the necessary ground to dis-apply 
within Germany the EU laws that the national judges deemed to have 
been enacted ultra vires, that is, in violation of the principle of 
conferred powers.252 
 Maastricht theorizes explicitly and unabashedly the European 
legal order as a subset of the international legal order:  
The Maastricht Treaty constitutes an agreement under international law 
establishing a compound of States of the Member States which is oriented 
towards further development. The inter-governmental community is dependent 
upon the Treaty continually being constantly revitalized by the Member States; 
 
249. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 
12, 1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 155; 
BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 
http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/Brunner_Sentence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5SY-YX7T] (archived Oct. 27, 2019), translated in 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 58 
(1994). As one scholar put it, the reduction of supranational commitments to the aims of 
international law was a “slap in the face of [Walter Hallstein’s] idea of legal community.” 
JO ERIC KHUSHAL MURKENS, FROM EMPIRE TO UNION 192 (2013) (quoting Ingolf Pernice, 
BVerfG, EGMR, und die Rechtgemeinschaft, 23 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FŪR 
WIRTSCHAFTRECHT 705, 706 (2004) (Ger.). 
250. See 89 BVerfGE 155 (“The Maastricht Treaty constitutes an agreement under 
international law establishing a compound of States of the Member States which is 
oriented towards further development. The inter-governmental community is dependent 
upon the Treaty continually being constantly revitalized by the Member States; the 
fulfillment and development of the Treaty must ensue from the will of the contracting 
parties.”). 
251. See ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, The Future of Political Autonomy: 
Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and 
Individualization, in CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THEORY (Mirjam Künkler & Tine 
Stein eds., 2017). 
252. Id.  
2020] IDENTITY FEDERALISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 251 
 
the fulfillment and development of the Treaty must ensue from the will of the 
contracting parties.253 
The Treaty of Maastricht is thus seen as establishing a community of 
states, whose identity is respected and autonomy guaranteed, as is the 
case in any international organization—“and not with membership in 
a single European State.”254 The conclusion, replete with international 
lingo, is that “Germany is therefore maintaining its status as a 
sovereign State in its own right as well as the status of sovereign 
equality with other States in the sense of Art. 2, sub-para 1 of the UN 
Charter of 26 June, 1945.”255 At the time of German reunification, as 
the Constitutional Court took it upon itself the task of replenishing the 
normative resources of the German state, German constitutionalism 
demanded that nation-states remain the controlling agents of 
European integration.256 
 In this brave (old) world, human rights are both insufficiently 
effective as the central medium for national resistance to European 
unification as well as too important a category to dismiss them 
outright. The task, then, is to repackage them. The starting point of 
the repackaging strategy is the depiction in both Solange I and II of 
human rights as an element of constitutional identity.257 Interestingly, 
however, self-government itself is part of the identity package, 
following Maastricht’s depiction of a community that promises to itself 
to preserve a space for politics where decisions affecting the life of each 
member will be made collectively.258 What, one might wonder, of the 
inherent normative tension between human rights, on the one hand, 
 
253. See 89 BVerfGE 155; BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 
http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/Brunner_Sentence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5SY-YX7T] (archived Oct. 27, 2019). As one scholar put it, the 
reduction of supranational commitments to the aims of international law was “a slap in 
the face of [Walter Hallstein’s] idea of legal community.” See MURKENS, supra note 249, 
at 192.  
254. See 89 BVerfGE 155, [16].  
255. See id. at [21]. The court would continue along the same lines in its Lisbon 
judgment. Christian Calliess calls it “almost tragic” that, in adopting an international 
law perspective, “the court is adopting this restrictive democratic approach towards the 
very organization which—contrary to classic institutional organizations like the UN and 
WTO—actually has a parliament that is directly elected by its citizens and has far-
reaching decision-making and control powers.” Christian Calliess, The Future of the 
Eurozone and the Role of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 31 Y.B. EUR. L. 402, 
406 (2012).  
256. See MURKENS, supra note 249, at 154 (arguing that the court’s use of meta-
concepts such as identity, statehood or sovereignty can be explained as a show of force 
vis-à-vis the ECJ, caused by the failure to reconceptualize public law, especially “the 
constitutional relation with the European Union”). 
257. See Perju, Uses and Misuses, supra note 226, at 283 (noting that both Solange 
I and Solange II rested on the German Constitution’s guarantee of a minimum standard 
of protection for fundamental human rights). 
258. See id. at 290–91.  
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and democracy, on the other? If national constitutional identity is to be 
coherent, its component elements, including human rights and the 
commitment to self-government, must be made coherent.259 This is not 
only a normative challenge but also, given the judgments of the 
German Constitutional Court, a doctrinal problem.  
 Doctrinally, one might expect a Solange III that sorts out the effect 
of democratic self-government on human rights, through the lens of 
constitutional identity. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that the 
Solange III label has been applied, among others, to the Maastricht260 
and Lisbon decisions,261 as well as cases in the European Arrest 
Warrant saga.262 So much has been included under that rubric that 
perhaps Solange III is best understood not so much as a case in 
waiting,263 but rather as the name, and an appropriate one at that, of 
an entire age of German, and indeed European, constitutionalism.  
C. The Constitutionalization of Identity  
 The analysis of how identity became constitutional doctrine 
proceeds in a few steps. The first is a study of the “constitutional 
identity lock” in the German legal system under the Lisbon judgment 
(subpart B.1.).264 The second is an analysis of the migration of identity 
across European legal orders, including the empowerment of courts 
and substantive difficulties that the adoption of doctrine of identity has 
created across national legal systems (subpart B.2.). Finally, subpart 
B.3. presents the crescendo from the early mention of identity in the 
judgment of the German Constitutional Court to the far less benign 
recent decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on 
“constitutional self-identity” that validated the Hungarian 
government’s refusal to apply EU regulations regarding the acceptance 
of asylum seekers.  
  
 
259. See Joseph Weiler et al., European Democracy and Its Critique, 18 WEST EUR. 
POL. 4, 34 (1995) (“Constitutionalism, despite its counter-majoritarian effect, is regarded 
as a complementary principle to majoritarianism rather than its negation.”). 
260. See, e.g., Kevin D. Makowski, Solange III: The German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s Decision on Accession to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 16 U. PA. J. 
INT’L BUS. L. 155, 174 (2014). 
261. See, e.g., Jacques Ziller, The German Constitutional Court’s Friendliness 
towards European Law: On the Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht over the 
Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, 16 EUR. PUB. L. 53, 56 (2010) (noting that the Lisbon 
Treaty builds on the German Constitutional Court’s “well-known solange theory”).  
262. See, e.g., Mathias Hong, Human Dignity, Identity Review of the European 
Arrest Warrant and the Court of Justice as a Listener in the Dialogue of Courts: Solange-
III and Aranyosi, 12 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 549, 550 (2016).  
263. The possibility that Solange III is a case in waiting has occasionally surfaced 
in German constitutional scholarship. See MURKENS, supra note 249, at 165. 
264. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 
30, 2009, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 267. 
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1. Identity and Democracy  
 G. Federico Mancini, a former judge at the ECJ, wrote that “the 
closer the [European] Union moves towards statehood, the greater the 
resistance to the attainment of this goal becomes.”265 Mancini captures 
accurately the historical moment at the end of the Cold War, when, 
just as the stars of history seemed aligned to further the project of 
European federalism,266 the protection of national identity 
transitioned to the supranational level. The Treaty of Maastricht 
included a provision that “[t]he Union shall respect the national 
identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are 
founded on the principles of democracy.”267 The historical explanation 
for the Europeanization of the protection of national identity has to do 
with the tradeoff that the project of unification had to pay for 
significant integration in several policy fields. Specifically, the 
protection of national identity was one of a number—and certainly not 
the most significant—of concessions to Germany, which made the 
difficult and momentous step of giving up its national currency when 
entering the Eurozone.268   
 The national identity clause was revised in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, specifically by detaching identity from democracy. The new 
Article 6(3) provides that “[t]he Union shall respect the national 
identities of its Member States,” thus allowing for the possibility, and 
arguably inviting, an interpretation of identity that goes beyond self-
government.269 Enter, then, Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union, which provides that  
 
265. G. Federico Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. L.J. 29, 31 
(1994). 
266. No coincidence, then, to find at that time the intervention. See Tim 
Koopmans, Federalism: The Wrong Debate, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1992) 
(“For the future of the peace in the world, the important thing is probably not to abolish 
States or to replace old States by new States, but to devise levels of coordinate 
government.”). 
267. Treaty on European Union, art. F, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 
[hereinafter Treaty of Maastricht]. 
268. By this I mean that it should be interpreted as a concession made to Germany. 
On the idea that guarantee of national identity was introduced to counterbalance the 
deeper integration in Maastricht, see Monica Claes, National Identity: Trump Card or 
Up for Negotiation?, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION, supra note 13, at 109, 118; Theodore Konstadinides, Constitutional 
Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within the Framework 
of National Constitutional Settlement, 13 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 195, 198 
(2012); Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 67, at 1435. 
269. Article F(1) TEU of the Maastricht Treaty was later replaced by Article 6(3) 
TEU of the Amsterdam Treaty. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European 
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 
art. 1, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (“The Union 
shall respect the national identities of its Member States”). In response to the invitation 
to go beyond self-government, the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
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[t]he Union shall respect the equality of Member States . . . as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect 
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.270 
 A few observers have interpreted the Lisbon provision as ratifying 
the case law of the German Constitutional Court on the resistance to 
European supremacy.271 The protection of constitutional national 
identity has been called “a beacon of European constitutional 
pluralism”272 and has been interpreted as “a strong re-affirmation of 
the non-federal structure of the European Union.”273 Indeed, the 
German Constitutional Court wasted little time in using the identity 
provision to draw anew, and in a far more visible form then before, the 
contours of its national sovereignty. In the Lisbon decision, the 
German judges included a list of the domains of public policy that must 
remain within the full control of German citizens.  The court held that 
particularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to 
democratically shape itself are decisions on substantive and formal 
criminal law (1), on the disposition of the monopoly on the use of force 
by the police within the state and by the military towards the exterior 
(2), fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue and public 
expenditure, the latter being particularly motivated, inter alia, by 
social policy considerations (3), decisions on the shaping of living 
conditions in a social state and (4), decisions of particular cultural 
importance, for example on family law, the school and education 
system, and on dealing with religious communities (5).274  
 
European Union reads: “national identities of the Member States and the organisation 
of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels.” Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]. 
270. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, art. 3a, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
271. See, e.g., Giuseppe Martinico, What Lies Behind Article 4(2) TEU?, in 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, supra note 13, at 93, 
95 (arguing that the Lisbon Treaty incorporated principles from the German 
Constitutional Court’s Solange decisions). 
272. See Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 67, at 1426 (the authors also argued that 
Art. 4(2) gave European expression to the controlimiti jurisprudence of the Italian and 
German Constitutional Court).  
273. See also Leonard F. M. Besselink, National and Constitutional Identity Before 
and After Lisbon, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 36, 48 (remarking that “the provision of Article 4(2) 
EU forms an important qualification of the rule on the primacy of EU law, and a 
modification of the case law under Costa v. ENEL.”). 
274. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, Jan. 14, 2014, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2014/01/rs20140
114_2bvr272813en.pdf;jsessionid=3AEB8D478F68787F97EE1F66F47BA732.1_cid394?
__blob=publicationFile&v=1 [https://perma.cc/BH88-H8SX] (archived on Oct. 27, 2019). 
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 It did not take long for critics to berate this list as political, 
random, and basically unsupported by any account of the nature of the 
state.275 Part of the problem is undoubtedly the court’s own role in 
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the protection, and implicitly the 
meaning, of national constitutional sovereignty, as “the task of the 
Federal Constitutional Court alone.”276 But when courts take on the 
task of defining the meaning of constitutional identity, they entrench 
the limits of identity, sovereignty, and supranational integration in 
ways that are almost impossible to overcome.277 
 Interestingly, the fundamental limitation, in the court’s 
interpretation, is subsumed to the imperative of respective national 
identity as outlined in Article 79(3) of the Basic Law (“unverfügbare 
Verfassungsidentität”).278 The court had already interpreted that 
provision in its Maastricht decision as a ban on subsequent 
supranational transfers of sovereign powers that could erode the 
fundamentals of German democracy.279 But in Lisbon it offers a more 
robust, and more protectionist approach. Specifically, it interprets the 
EU as an association of sovereign national states (a so‐called 
Staatenverbund).280 EU member states may transfer sovereign rights 
to the EU but they do not thereby remain depleted of sovereignty.281 It 
follows, in this view, that whatever sovereignty supranational 
institutions can claim is derived, rather than autonomous.   
 The colonizing tendencies of the concept of identity are apparent 
in recent case law of German courts, where identity review has become 
the ground of resistance to European federalism that distills and 
integrates previous doctrines of resistance (human rights, ultra vires 
 
275. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam & Christoph Möllers, The German 
Constitutional Court Says “Ja zu Deutschland!”, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1241 (2009). 
276. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, Jan. 14, 2014, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2014/01/rs20140
114_2bvr272813en.pdf;jsessionid=3AEB8D478F68787F97EE1F66F47BA732.1_cid394?
__blob=publicationFile&v=1 [https://perma.cc/BH88-H8SX] (archived on Oct. 27, 2019). 
277. In France, by contrast, the task of ascribing meaning to identity has been 
taken up by scholars rather than courts. See Bertrand Mathieu, Les rapports normatifs 
entre le droit communautaire et le droit national: Bilan et incertitudes relatifs aux 
évolutions récentes de la jurisprudence des juges constitutionnel et administratif français, 
REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONTITUTIONNEL 675 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he principle 
of laïcité, the definition of the persons entitled to vote in French political elections, the 
prohibition to give specific rights to ethnic, linguistic and other minorities and the 
definition of the criteria for access to public functions” are part of constitutional identity). 
See generally Jan Komárek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EUR. CONST. 
L. REV. 420 (2013) (analyzing conflicts between constitutional courts and the EU). 
278. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 
30, 2009, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 267.  
279. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 
1993, 89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 155. 
280. See 123 BVerfGE 267. 
281. Id. 
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review).282 In a case involving the execution of a European arrest 
warrant, the judges bridged the identity and human rights review to 
hold that human dignity is part of constitutional identity and part of 
its human rights mandate.283 Accordingly, identity is used to establish 
a separate national track for the protection of human rights whose 
activation does not depend, as the court had previously held,284 on a 
structural deficiency of the protection of human rights at the 
supranational level. The national track is not subsidiary, and can thus 
be invoked, through the human dignity guarantee, by all rights 
holders.285  
2. The Migration of Identity  
 The versatility, malleability, and effectiveness of identity review 
in German constitutional law explains its extraordinary appeal and 
fast migration across jurisdictions within the EU. German identity 
 
282. Both of the two preliminary references that the German Constitutional Court 
has ever sent to Luxembourg mention constitutional identity. In 2014, the German 
Constitutional Court sent a preliminary reference on whether the outright monetary 
transaction (OMT) mechanisms of the European Central Bank, which allowed the 
purchase of governments' bonds on the secondary market, exceeded the mandate of the 
ECB and violated the EU prohibition of monetary funding. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., 
Feb. 7, 2014, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/ 
2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.pdf;jsessionid=3AEB8D478F68787F97EE1F66F47
BA732.1_cid394?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 [https://perma.cc/XD3H-UZXZ] (archived 
Oct. 27, 2019). The German court included in the preliminary reference language to the 
effect that it— Karlsruhe—has the right to decide whether the OMT decision “could 
violate the constitutional identity of the Basic Law if it created a mechanism which 
would amount to an assumption of liability for decisions of third parties which entail 
[budgetary] consequences that are difficult to calculate.” Id at 102. In August 2017, the 
German Constitutional Court mentioned the German constitutional identity in a 
preliminary reference to Luxembourg on whether the legality of the European Central 
Bank’s public sector purchase program. BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15 et al., Aug. 15, 2017, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2017/07/rs20170
718_2bvr085915en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 [https://perma.cc/CCC3-SD76] 
(archived Oct. 27, 2019). For the ECJ’s response, see E.C.J. Case C‑493/17, Weiss, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=8A44291A7920BE6F2D0
41528FB26AE18?text=&docid=208741&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&oc
c=first&part=1&cid=7848713 [https://perma.cc/T3Y9-WLT5] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) 
(holding that the challenged program is compatible with EU law). 
283. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2735/14, Dec. 15, 2015, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2015/12/rs20151
215_2bvr273514en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 [https://perma.cc/B56H-MWSR] 
(archived Oct. 27, 2019). 
284. BVerfG, 1 BvF 1/05, ¶ 47, Mar. 13, 2007, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2007/03/fs2
0070313_1bvf000105en.html [https://perma.cc/LUY6-ZAUS] (archived Oct. 27, 2019). 
285. For analysis, see Julian Nowag, EU Law, Constitutional Identity, and Human 
Dignity: A Toxic Mix?, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1441, 1450–51 (2017) (noting that the 
German Constitutional Court has required human dignity compliance under national 
law, “no matter in what way EU law develops”).  
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review has become a model for other constitutional courts.286 The 
doctrine has traveled from the United Kingdom, where the Supreme 
Court held that incorporation into national law of EU legislation 
cannot be intended to abrogate rule of law principles in the constitution 
or common law,287 to France, where the Conseil constitutionnel held 
that transposition of EU legislation should not violate a rule or 
principle that was inherent in the constitutional identity of France.288 
Even the Constitutional Court of Belgium, which has been one of the 
most obedient apex courts, has found constitutional identity 
irresistible.289 Moving toward the new member states, the Slovak 
Constitutional Court held that the Constitutional Court has the power 
 
286. Kriszta Kovács, The Rise of an Ethnocultural Constitutional Identity in the 
Jurisprudence of the East Central European Courts, 18 GERMAN L.J. 1703, 1705 (2017) 
(“[T]he German Federal Constitutional Court served as a role model for V4 [the Visegrád 
Group: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia] courts to empower 
themselves to exercise identity review”). See also Ágoston Mohay & Norbert Tóth, 
Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental 
Law, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 468, 472 (2017) (arguing that “[i]t is particularly interesting to 
note that, in reaching its decision, the [Hungarian] Constitutional Court expressly 
referred to and summarized the most relevant case law of other EU member states’ 
constitutional courts, thus emphasizing the importance of judicial dialogue between 
those courts themselves and with the CJEU. In this connection, it seems that the 
Constitutional Court views the German Federal Constitutional Court (the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht) as its greatest influence. In and of itself, that is not 
problematic, but the Court's approach appears somewhat oversimplified (a ‘cut-and-
paste’ affair) that failed to provide a deeper dogmatic analysis of why the Hungarian and 
German constitutional systems do or should share the same constitutional core or follow 
the same avenues of control”). It is equally interesting, however, how the German 
Constitutional Court itself relied on foreign law to establish the legitimacy of its identity 
jurisprudence. See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, ¶ 47, June 30, 2009, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es2
0090630_2bve000208en.html [https://perma.cc/FVE5-JU33] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) 
(enumerating a half dozen jurisdictions that share the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
view that the precedence (of application) of European Union law does not apply 
unrestrictedly, but that it is restricted by national (constitutional) law and specifically 
by provisions such as “constitutional identity and to limit the transfer of sovereign 
powers to the European Union”).  
287. See R v. Sec’y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3, [111] (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (advancing the argument that a Court of Justice order should not be construed in 
a way that questions “the identity of the national constitutional order”).  
288. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006–
540DC, July 27, 2006, J.O. du 3 août 2006, 11541 (Fr.) (“The transposition of a Directive 
cannot run counter to a rule or principle inherent to the constitutional identity of France, 
except when the constituting power consents thereto.”); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] 
[Constitutional Council] decision No. 2011–631DC, June 9, 2011, J.O. du 17 juin 2011, 
10306 (Fr.) (refusing to review a domestic law’s compatibility with EU directives). 
289. Philippe Gérard & Willem Verrijdt, Belgian Constitutional Court Adopts 
National Identity Discourse, 13 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 182, 186–88 (2017) (analyzing the 
Belgian Constitutional Court’s non-binding opinion that it has the power to review 
legislatively approved treaties or the implementation of those treaties to ensure they 
comport with the Belgian constitution).  
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to review EU law in order to protect Slovak constitutional identity290 
and the Croatian legal establishment is similarly seized with these 
identity matters.291  
 Particularly revealing is the Taricco case of the Italian 
Constitutional Court.292 In that case, the Italian court, which has a 
long history of tensions with the ECJ,293 used the concept of identity 
for the first time. At issue in this case was the application of the ECJ’s 
previous preliminary reference, demanding that Italian judges 
disapply national statutes of limitations rules that would undercut 
domestic prosecution of tax crimes against the EU. 294 Specifically, the 
question was whether the ECJ’s answer must be applied even when 
the effect of its application would undermine the principle of legality 
in criminal law, which is a fundamental principle of the Italian 
Constitution.295 The ECJ took issue with the doctrinal premise of the 
question, and pointed out that the application of the principle of 
legality in this case would not clash with the principle of retroactivity 
in criminal law, because legality does not apply to a procedural matter, 
such as the statute of limitations.296 When the case returned to the 
Italian Constitutional Court, the court relied on the concept of identity 
although not quite in the manner that the constitutional nationalists 
would have liked.297 The court drew connections between 
constitutional identity and constitutional traditions and pointed out 
 
290. Ústavny súd Slovenskej rupubliky [Constitutional Court of Slovakia] Apr. 6, 
2011, Decision No. II. ÚS 501/2010. 
291. See Branko Smerdel, In Quest of a Doctrine: Croatian Constitutional Identity 
in the European Union, 64 ZBORNIK PFZ 513, 518 (2014) (asserting the importance of a 
national constitutional identity in the context of EU integration). 
292. See Order, Nov. 23, 2016, n.24, G.U. Feb. 1, 2017 (It.) (declaring that the 
ECJ’s rule in Tarrico violated the Italian Constitution’s prohibition on retroactive 
application of criminal statutes).  
293. In Frontini, the Italian Constitutional Court held that the EU must respect 
the “fundamental principles of our constitutional order.” Corte Costituzionale (Corte 
Cost.) (Constitutional Court), 27 Dicembre 1973, n.183, Foro it. 1974, I, 97, 314–29, 
translated in 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 372 (1974); see Corte Cost., 8 giugno 1984, n.170, 
29 Giur. Cost. I 1098, translated in 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 756, 762–63 (1984) 
(acknowledging the supremacy of European Community rules with direct effect over 
national legislation). 
294. See Case C-105/14, Taricco & Others, 2015 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=164056&mode=req&pageInd
ex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=7561101 
[https://perma.cc/Z3T8-LVBB] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (requiring Italian courts to 
disapply criminal law provisions when certain conditions are met). 
295. Art. 25 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“No case may be removed from the court 
seized with it as established by law. No punishment may be inflicted except by virtue of 
a law in force at the time the offence was committed. No restriction may be placed on a 
person's liberty save for as provided by law.”).  
296. For analysis, see Fabbrini & Pollicino, supra note 11, at 11–14 (discussing the 
procedural history of the Taricco case).  
297. See Order, Nov. 23, 2016, n.24, G.U. Feb. 1, 2017 (It.) (emphasizing the 
importance of both national and European constitutional traditions). 
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the pluralism inherent in the constitutional traditions.298 This 
indicates an avenue open in Europe, although not so much in the 
United States, where discretion in the interpretation of identity is 
limited by the appeal to tradition.299 
 If national constitutional identity is not tied to a concept such as 
tradition, the task of judicial definition is even more fraught with risk. 
Constitutional courts have often struggled to answer this question 
without losing face. The elements that national courts have subsumed 
under the rubric of identity are oftentimes banal and common. They 
include elements such as the “basic values and principles [of the 
constitution],”300 “inalienable human rights,”301 or “the essential 
attributes of democracy or the rule of law.”302 Somewhat less 
abstractly, courts have referred to the principle of certainty,303 the 
general principles of nondiscrimination, or even the obligation to give 
reasons.304 The difficulty, however, is that all these principles 
characterize both the European and the municipal (all the municipal 
legal orders305), so that, to the extent that identity includes an element 
of differentiation, that work could be done only at the interpretative 
level. And, as it is often the case in law, interpretation becomes less a 
matter of substance than structure—specifically, a claim over which 
specific interpretation has allocated the power to issue authoritative 
statements about the meaning of a particular principle.306 This is 
interpretation as turf.307 
 
298. See id. (asserting that Member States may adopt a particular understanding 
of European constitutional traditions).  
299. For an early argument in favor of connecting identity with tradition, see 
Wojciech Sadurski, European Constitutional Identity? 7–21 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working 
Paper No. 33, 2006). 
300. See S.T.C., Dec. 13, 2004 (B.O.E., No. 3, 5) (Spain) (declaring that some 
provisions of the Constitution of Spain place limits on the applicability of European law). 
301. See Fabbrini & Pollicino, supra note 11, at 3 (“Italy epitomizes the case of a 
founding EU member state where the supreme institutional actors have never 
systematically identified a core set of fundamental elements or values functionally 
designed to protect the identity of the polity against supranational interference.”). 
302. See Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 03.05.2006 (ÚS) [Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006], sp.zn Pl. ÚS 66/04. 
303. Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 67, at 1437 (analyzing the language used by 
constitutional courts when identifying constitutional limits to EU laws). 
304. Id. 
305. Kumm, supra note 53, at 120 (“the universality of an ideal does not make it 
formally inadequate as an ideal central to the identity of a particular community”).  
306. See Vlad Perju, Supranational States in the Postnational Constellation, INT’L 
J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2019). 
307. What stands out is how in deciding these cases, the national courts do not 
send preliminary references to Luxembourg. See supra Part IV.A. For a similar 
observation, see Mohay & Tóth, supra note 286, at 473 (noting, with regard to the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, that the court did not even consider requesting a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU). 
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 The examples above show that judicial discretion has been 
particularly difficult to contain when courts have sought to fill out the 
meaning of identity proactively. But when confronted with specific 
cases, discretion has been somewhat contained by the factual 
circumstances of specific cases. The UK Supreme Court, for instance, 
has held that the EU lacks the power to make decisions about British 
citizenship, which is part of the national constitutional identity.308 
While, at least initially, the German Constitutional Court sought to 
keep ultra vires separate from identity, other courts have been less 
rigorous. In the Czech Republic, in 2012, the Constitutional Court 
assumed jurisdiction to review a decision of the ECJ applying EU 
legislation on the harmonization of pension systems among national 
legal systems, and holding that social security benefits of Czech 
retirees should include the period they worked in Czechoslovakia prior 
to that country’s dissolution in 1992. The Czech judges held that the 
ECJ exceeded the EU’s competencies to regulate solely cross-border 
situations and should therefore be inapplicable within the jurisdiction 
of the Czech Republic.309 By holding the ECJ’s decision ultra vires, the 
Czech constitutional judges acted in violation of foundational doctrines 
of European constitutionalism that give the ECJ the final word over 
the interpretation of the EU law, including on jurisdictional 
matters.310 As in Germany, the Czech court subsumed the ultra vires 
ground, and therefore was immunized to identity review.311    
3. Identity and Nationalism  
 The history of European constitutional identity includes many 
instances where national legal orders set the theoretical grounds for 
resisting the claims of European federalism but did not follow through 
in practice. The German Constitutional Court, which assumed a 
leadership role in opposing European integration, never rendered a 
piece of European legislation without effect either on the human rights 
or the limited conferral grounds.312 Identity seems eminently 
 
308. See Pham v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] UKSC 19, [58], [82], 
[90]–[91] (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that ultimately domestic courts determine 
the jurisdictional limits of European treaties).  
309. Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 31.01.2012 (ÚS) [Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of Jan. 31, 2012], sp.zn Pl. ÚS 5/12. 
310. For a discussion, see Jan Komárek, Case Note, Playing with Matches: the 
Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra 
Vires; Judgment of January 31, 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII, 8 EUR. CONST. 
L. REV. 323, 328–34 (2012) (explaining why the Constitutional Court’s decision was 
“plainly wrong” and giving context for the decision).  
311. Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 03.05.2006 (ÚS) [Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006], sp.zn Pl. ÚS 66/04. 
312. Between 1974 (Solange I) and 1986 (Solange II), the German Constitutional 
Court did not exercise the prerogative it claimed for itself to deprive of effect EU 
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positioned to change that dynamic by emboldening national courts to 
follow through with their threats.  
 Some instances are worrisome but largely benign. The case of the 
Czech Constitutional Court decision in the Landtová case discussed 
above is one such example.313 Another example, if somewhat more 
concerning, is the 2016 Ajos decision of the Danish Constitutional 
Court.314 In that case, the Danish judges refused to apply the EU 
principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of age to a dispute between 
private parties.315 The Danish judges explained that such application 
lacked explicit grounding in the EU Treaty, that it was the creation of 
the ECJ and that, if applied in the case at hand, it would violate the 
terms of Denmark’s accession to the EU and lead the Danish 
Constitutional Court to overstep its own jurisdictional boundaries.316 
While the ECJ’s far-reaching case law on the general principle of 
nondiscrimination on the basis of age into domestic law had given rise 
to many controversies, the Danish court went one big step further 
when it declined to fulfill its duties under EU law.317 While the Danish 
court did not use explicitly the concept of identity, identity’s radiating 
effect informs the legal analysis. Identity is the genus proximus for the 
principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate 
expectations, which contrast here with the principle of 
nondiscrimination on the basis of age.318 This debate engages some of 
the most central doctrines of European constitutionalism.319 A case 
more difficult to classify comes from Romania. There, the Romanian 
Constitutional Court held that its duties under the national 
constitution rank higher than any obligation to protect judicial 
independence and comply with other anticorruption safeguard 
mechanisms upon which the supranational institution conditioned the 
country’s EU accession.320 
 
legislative acts that violated the fundamental rights provisions of the German Basic 
Law. For a discussion, see Perju, Uses and Misuses, supra note 226, at 263–95. 
313. Czech Constitutional Court, Pl U.S 66/04, May 3, 2006, 
314. Danish Constitutional Court Case no. 15/2014 Dansk Industri (DI) acting for 
Ajos A/S v. Estate of A (relating to European Court of Justice, Case C-441/14 Dansk 
Industri, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen).  
315. Id. 
316. Id. at 45–51. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 9–10. 
319. Rass Holdgaard, et al., From Cooperation to Collision: The ECJ’s Ajos Ruling 
and the Danish Supreme Court’s Refusal to Comply, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17 (2018); 
see also Urška Šadl & Sabine Mair, Mutual Disempowerment: Case C-441/14 Dansk 
Industri, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen and Case no. 
15/2014 Dansk Industri (DI) acting for Ajos A/S v. The estate left by A, 13 EUR. CONST. 
L. REV. 347 (2017). 
320. Romanian Constitutional Court, Judgment nr. 104/2018, ¶¶ 88–90 and 
Judgment nr. 137/2019, ¶ 77.  
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 When identity is combined with authoritarian populism, the 
result is to take resistance to European integration to new levels. The 
case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court stands out in this 
context.321 Litigation ensued over disagreements over Hungary’s 
reallocation of asylum seekers under EU Decision 2015/1601.322 The 
government had failed to stop the application of the EU Decision by 
way of a constitutional amendment that would have introduced in the 
Hungarian Fundamental Law language to the effect that “[w]e hold 
that the defense of our constitutional self-identity, which is rooted in 
our historical constitution, is the fundamental responsibility of the 
state.”323 The newly amended EU clause would have stipulated that 
EU law “in harmony with the fundamental rights and freedoms 
established in the Fundamental Law must not place restrictions on 
Hungarian territory, its population, the state, or its inalienable 
rights.”324 The Hungarian Constitutional Court, which had been 
captured by Viktor Orbán’s regime, used the constitutional doctrine of 
identity to accomplish what the government could not accomplish 
through political means.325 The court held that accepting asylum 
seekers into Hungary pursuant to the EU scheme would amount to a 
violation of the constitutional self-identity of Hungary.326 That identity 
was “a fundamental value not created by the Fundamental Law—it is 
merely acknowledged by the Fundamental Law.”327 The court held that 
constitutional identity is rooted in Hungary’s history and as such 
cannot be dispensed with by way of international treaty.328 The 
decision is replete with the vestiges of nationalism, shot through with 
references to mystic patriotism and Saint Stephen’s Holy Crown as a 
source of authority.329 The constitution must be interpreted in the light 
of the Preamble called the “National Avowal” and the “achievements of 
the historical constitution,” Article R(3).330 
 Particularly relevant is the way in which the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court reaches out to the German Constitutional Court 
 
321. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016, 
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.). 
322. EU Decision 2015/1601 (Sept 22, 2015).  
323. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016, 
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.). 
324. See Gábor Halmai, Abuse of Constitutional Identity: The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court on Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law, 43 REV. 
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 23 (2018). 
325. Id.  
326. For further analysis, see id. 
327. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016, 
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.). 
328. Id. 
329. For a study, see Kovács, supra note 285, at 1705. 
330. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] Nov. 30, 2016, 
AK.XII.5 22/2016 (Hung.).  
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for inspiration on how to use the concept of identity as a doctrinal tool 
that integrates both human rights and ultra vires considerations.331 
The Hungarian judges held that it falls within its own scope of 
competences, on the basis of a relevant petition, in exceptional cases 
and as a resort of ultima ratio, i.e. along with paying respect to the 
constitutional dialogue between the member states, it can examine 
whether exercising competences on the basis of Article (E)(2) of the 
Fundamental Law results in the violation of human dignity, the 
essential content of any other fundamental right or the sovereignty 
(including the extent of the competences transferred by the state) and 
the constitutional self-identity of Hungary. While the court retains the 
right to determine the content of constitutional identity on a case-by-
case basis, it did offer some guideposts: “freedoms, the division of 
powers, republic as the form of government, respect of autonomies 
under public law, the freedom of religion, exercising lawful authority, 
parliamentarism, equality of rights, acknowledging judicial power, the 
protection of nationalities that are living in Hungary.”332  
 At a general level, little about this statement sounds inherently 
problematic. Yet, in its specific application, its wide range enables the 
Hungarian judges to draw bright lines to European integration. Such 
unilateral action would have the result of fragmenting European 
federalism even under regular circumstance. But when the loss of the 
court’s judicial independence renders the court a mouthpiece for a 
government engaged in the undoing of the rule of law and the 
Hungarian constitutional state,333 identity shows its dark effects.  
 Hungary is not the only jurisdiction where these effects are 
already visible. In October 2018, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union granted a consequential, if somewhat unusual, interim order at 
the request of the European Commission acting as plaintiff in an 
infringement action against Poland.334 The ECJ ordered Poland to 
reinstate with immediate effect judges of the Polish Supreme Court 
who had been forced into early retirement by legislation overhauling 
the Polish judiciary.335 The European Commission alleged that the 
legislative measures violate judicial independence as protected under 
EU law and would produce harm that was irreparable if not corrected 
without delay.336 After some initial grumbling, the Polish authorities 
implemented the ECJ’s interim order, although concomitantly they 
referred the matter to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, asking for 
 
331. See Kovács, supra note 286, at 1705. 
332. Id.  
333. See generally Kelemen, supra note 27, at 211; Pech & Scheppele, supra note 
27, at 3. 
334. Case C–619/18, R Commission v. Poland, Order of the Vice-President of the 
Court, E.C.J. Oct. 19, 2018.  
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
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clarification as to what effect, if any, an ultra vires act of the EU can 
have in Poland.337 The question was tongue in cheek. The Polish 
Tribunal had previously held that national authorities are under no 
duty to give effect to acts of EU institutions that transgress the 
delegation of national powers to the European level.338 While “acts of 
EU institutions” are typically construed to refer to secondary 
legislation, acts of the ECJ, including orders and judgments, can also 
be subject to review.339 Thus, when national apex courts determine 
that Luxembourg has transgressed its powers under the EU Treaty, 
national judges will likely perform almost a reverse-Mangold340 review 
and take the treaty’s enforcement into their own hands.  
 The ECJ delivered its judgment in this case in June 2019.341 The 
court held, without specifically engaging Poland’s identity-based 
arguments, that lowering the retirement age of the judges of the 
Supreme Court of Poland and that “granting the President of the 
Republic the discretion to extend the period of judicial activity of judges 
of that court beyond the newly fixed retirement age, the Republic of 
Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations” to respect judicial 
independence.342 This, however, may not be the end of the matter. A 
decision on this matter of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is yet to 
be delivered.343 The Warsaw Trybunał Konstytucyjny may well choose 
to reiterate existing precedent that the Polish Constitution enjoys 
“precedence of binding force and precedence of application”344 over EU 
 
337. For analysis, see Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, From Constitutional to Political 
Justice: The Tragic Trajectories of the Polish Constitutional Court, VERFBLOG (Feb. 27, 
2019), https://verfassungsblog.de/from-constitutional-to-political-justice-the-tragic-
trajectories-of-the-polish-constitutional-court/ [https://perma.cc/789X-S8UW] (archived 
Jan. 13, 2020). 
338. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) Nov. 24, 2010, Case no. K 32/09 (Treaty 
of Lisbon).  
339. Pursuant to this understanding, the Italian Corte costituzionale held recently 
that Italian authorities are under no obligation to implement ECJ decision that conflict 
with Italian constitutional identity. See Italian Constitutional Court Order No. 24, § 2 
(2017), https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/ 
O_24_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A84Z-YKL5] (archived Dec. 3, 2019). For another recent 
similar holding, see R v. Sec’y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (holding itself free not to implement decisions of the ECJ that go too far, and 
continuing to apply national law).  
340. Case C–144/04, Mangold v. Helm, E.C.J. Nov. 22, 2005. The Court of Justice 
of the European Union held that, in the area of non-discrimination of the basis of age, 
EU legislation codifies constitutional principles that already exist in the Member States. 
The implication is that those national principles receive heightened protection from their 
recognition at the supranational level, including by the ECJ. A reverse-Mangold 
situation would place national courts in charge of enforcing supranational law.  
341. Case C–619/18, E.C.J. June 24, 2019.  
342. Id. 
343. For a second recent decision of the ECJ, see A. K. & Others (Independence of 
the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) (C–585/18, C 624/18, C–625/18), Nov. 
19, 2019.  
344. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) May 11, 2005, Case 18/04, ¶ 11. 
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law as well as the central role of the ultra vires doctrine in preserving 
the ability of the “Republic of Poland to continue functioning as a 
sovereign and democratic state.”345 The Trybunał may also mention its 
duty to protect the national constitutional identity of Poland 
(tożsamość konstytucyjna),346 wherein democratic self-government, 
translated as the ability of the Polish political community to govern 
themselves through its freely chosen representatives enacting laws, 
such as the judiciary reforms at issue here, reigns supreme. If, further, 
the authority of EU law in the legal systems of its member states is 
granted not pursuant to the Treaty itself but rather “by virtue of 
[national] constitutional empowerment,”347 as the German 
Constitutional Court held in the Lisbon decision, then the normative 
interface between the supranational and national legal orders becomes 
even harder to police from a supranational level. 
V. THE FUTURE(S) OF IDENTITY FEDERALISM  
 This Part turns the attention to a few of the possible central 
themes in the future of identity federalism. Subpart V.A. discusses 
centralization as backlash to identity claims on behalf of subunits. 
Subpart V.B. discusses the alignments of attachments outside of the 
binary model of state (nation-state) and federal (supranational). It 
looks to the formation of identity in the middle, in-between spaces. 
Regionalism is one such example. Finally, subpart V.C. returns to the 
specific claims of identity in the age of populism.   
A.  Centralization  
 Like all theories that seek to ground state sovereignty, identity 
federalism sooner or later encounters attempts to curb the centrifugal 
tendencies that it generates within a federal system. Each such system 
has mechanisms of centralization ready to be activated in these 
situations. The arc of American federalism, after the Civil War but 
particularly post–New Deal, has included a broad interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause, which, together with a strict enforcement of the 
 
345. Id. ¶ 8. 
346. TK (Polish Constitutional Tribunal) Nov. 24, 2010, Case nr. K 32/09 (Treaty 
of Lisbon). For a study, see Anna Śledzińska-Simon & Michał Ziółkowski, Constitutional 
Identity of Poland: Is the Emperor Putting On the Old Clothes of Sovereignty?, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN A EUROPE OF MULTILEVEL CONSTITUTIONALISM 243 
(Christian Calliess ed., 2019). 
347. German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 123, 267 (348-349, 354, 397, 400, 402) 
Lissabon (2009). Cf. English translation, supra n.8, §§ 240 (“the primacy . . . only applies 
by virtue and in the context of the constitutional empowerment”), 331–32 (‘primacy by 
virtue of constitutional empowerment’), 334–35, 339, 343.  
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supremacy clause and a rigorous interpretation of preemption 
doctrines, have become the doctrinal mechanisms to support the 
political, cultural, and social homogenization. It is true that some 
doctrines have survived this process of nationalization, which justify 
the leeway they afford to states by reference to their identity. One such 
example is the “independent interpretation” doctrine, which concerns 
the interpretation of provisions in a state constitution that mirror 
those of the federal constitution.348 According to this doctrine, while 
state courts cannot violate federal law, they may decide to give state 
constitutional provisions different meaning than the federal 
constitution.349   
 The European experience proves the challenges of doctrinalizing 
identity, especially at both the federal and subfederal levels. As shown, 
the duty of the EU to protect the national (constitutional) identity of 
its member states is specifically included in the Treaty of Lisbon.350 
The question then becomes what constitutes identity, and who gets to 
answer that question. National constitutional courts have been hard at 
work seeking to define, each for themselves, the meaning of their 
identity. But while the efforts of national courts might have been 
triggered by developments at the European level, many national 
courts, as it has been shown, framed their efforts as one mandated by 
their own national constitutions. As the German Constitutional Court 
has spelled out, it is possible that the meaning of national identity 
under the national constitution could fall outside of the boundaries of 
what deserves protection as national constitutional identity at the 
European level.351 From the standpoint of the national constitution, 
the list of identity might be considerably longer and the need for 
identity protection further reaching. To take just one example from the 
Germany context, the German Constitutional Court has held that 
fiscal decisions are central to democratic self-government and that 
their delegation to the supranational, European level, would violate 
the identity of the German Constitution.352 From the European 
perspective, however, the Eurozone crisis has exposed the inherent 
instability of a monetary union that is not backed up by a fiscal 
union.353 Political proposals to prop up the Eurozone have inevitably 
 
348. Schapiro, supra note 4, at 393. 
349. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–44 (1983). For analysis, see James A. 
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(1998); Schapiro, supra note 4, at 393. 
350. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4(2), 2010 O.J. C 
83/01 [hereinafter TEU]. 
351. See Claes & Reestman, supra note 28, at 938–41. 
352. BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08; see supra Section III.B.1.  
353. For a recent such argument, see Pierpaolo Barbieri & Shahin Vallée, A Fiscal 
Union for the Eurozone: The Only Way to Save the EU, FOREIGN AFF. MAG. (Sept. 26, 
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included the creation of a common budgetary mechanism that would 
amount to a fiscal union.354 Would such reforms, which are arguably 
indispensable to the future of the European Union, violate Germany’s 
national constitutional identity? Could Germany invoke that 
constitutional identity in order to prevent their application, and would 
such invocation be deemed compatible with the demands of European 
constitutionalism? The German court made the implications of 
constitutional identity explicit in its first-ever preliminary reference on 
whether the European Central Bank could lawfully purchase bonds 
through special mechanisms put in place during the Eurozone crisis.355  
 The outcome of this clash of identity versus identity remains 
unknown because the ECJ’s approach to defining the meaning of 
national identity at the European level has thus far been cautious and 
pragmatic. Thus far, the ECJ held that national constitutional identity 
can be used to justify the limitation on free movement stemming from 
the prohibition of last names that retain nobility titles.356 The ECJ has 
upheld a national interpretation of human dignity;357 holding that a 
national language constitutes “a constitutional asset which preserves 
the nation’s identity”;358 freedom of assembly and expression;359 media 
diversity;360 and protection of minors.361 But it is far from apparent 
what exactly the concept of constitutional identity does in these cases. 
Here, EU law defers to national law in grounds for reasons that are 
cultural. But if that is sufficient to bring them within the purview of 
the national identity, then this clause is so broad that it includes 
virtually everything. Unsurprisingly, it has been argued that 
 
2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-09-26/fiscal-union-eurozone 
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constitutional identity is the new label for the court’s longtime 
jurisprudence of limitations on the fundamental freedom of 
movement.362 Moreover, very few decisions of the ECJ require EU 
institutions to take into consideration the national identity of its 
member states.363 In no case does Article 4(2) by itself constitute 
sufficient ground for the holding. The ECJ has rejected pleas to 
recognize that respect for national identity has been part of European 
constitutionalism from the beginning of European integration.364 
There are, of course, cases of exceptions from the fundamental 
freedoms, but it is hard to see how they can be interpreted as 
“constitutional identity” cases. Moreover, and importantly, the ECJ 
has refused to tweak its supremacy jurisprudence to accommodate a 
constitutional identity clause.365 
 But, and importantly, the ECJ offers authentic interpretations of 
the EU Treaty. It can, in that capacity, control the effect of national 
identity by imposing a unitary meaning. This area seems ideally suited 
for the ECJ to claim, as it so often does, that the effectiveness of EU 
law would be eroded if member states could invoke their identity in 
order to apply EU law selectively. This need not deny member states 
of any powers in this area, but it simply circumscribes their 
interpretations to a range of acceptable meanings.366  
 It helps to recall in this context that the concept of constitutional 
identity does not enter the universe of European constitutionalism in 
a vacuum. Rather, it enters at a particular moment in time and within 
a framework that has been developing for over half a century. The 
identity provision becomes part of EU law, at least in this form, at the 
moment when it is least likely to have much of an effect. Not quite the 
extraordinary tool that its advocates see in it, identity receives this 
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more robust formulation at the time when—and, to some extent, 
precisely because—it can be easily neutralized using existing 
European doctrines.367 First, its reach is restricted by the existence of 
other provisions, such as mainly Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union.368 While the abstract text of neither provision interprets itself, 
it seems quite straightforward that the several interpretations will 
have to meet a certain threshold of normative coherence. It is hard to 
believe that a regime such as Hungary’s, for instance, will be allowed 
to invoke national identity in order to protect itself from European 
scrutiny. Emphasis here is on the verb “allow” since the Hungarian 
government will certainly seek to invoke Article 4(2).  
 A second related reason why the identity provision need not 
amount to a limitation of supremacy is that, by inclusion into the 
treaty, the concept of identity becomes a concept of EU law. The 
implication is that the court, in its “pre-eminent position of the ECJ as 
the ultimate interpreter of this legal order,”369 can control its effect by 
centralizing its meaning. The ECJ has used this technique previously 
throughout its jurisprudence, for instance  when defining the meaning 
of concepts such as the meaning of “worker”370 or “disability.”371 The 
European judges might be particularly inclined to harmonize the 
meaning of constitutional identity given the lessons of what the ultra 
vires tool has done in the hands of disobedient national courts. But 
even as they try to do that, and the same would be true in the case of 
American federalism, they themselves would be forced to use the 
category of identity. The tendency to shape conflict between different 
levels of jurisdiction as identity versus identity is specific to what is 
referred to above as the vortex that identity produces within a legal 
system.  
B. Regionalism  
 The above discussion has assumed the existence of a binary of 
states within a federal system, whether that system is of a traditional 
kind such as the United States or of an arguably sui generis kind such 
as the European Union. Yet, for all the complexities that we have 
identified in relation to the formation of identity,372 it seems both 
contrived and inaccurate to assume that identity lines up neatly within 
these two levels of government. In fact, identities might defy those 
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372. See supra Part I.A.  
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preexistent structures and cluster instead in the in-between spaces. 
Moving to theorize these developments, scholars of American 
federalism have focused on “the region as a subnational area 
encompassing all or part of multiple states” and thus “depart[ing] from 
established state and federal jurisdictional lines to form a supra state 
yet subnational area.”373 It is in these in-between spaces that much of 
the politics is focused, whether in the area of immigration, 
environmental regulations, or education.374 
 While regions have a pronounced territorial aspect, a focus on 
identity makes it possible to entertain a deterritorialized network of 
interests. When states sue the federal government in order to enjoin 
action or to prevent it, they are creating a network that occupies a 
space their action creates between the states and the national 
government. Sometimes that space does have a more pronounced 
regional aspect, as is the case when states along the southern border 
seek to put pressure on the federal government’s immigration 
policies.375 But in other cases, most prominently environmental cases, 
identity creates regions of common interest that do not have a 
territorial representation.376 This complicates the neat picture of the 
overlap between structure and interests.  
 This issue is also present in the European context. Scholars of 
European integration have explored if the EU can be understood as a 
number of different unions, rather than one, all-encompassing 
organization.377 The constitutive treaties are full of opt outs and 
particular derogations. More importantly, the treaty itself permits 
member states to engage in “enhanced cooperation,” that is, to 
establish and pursue initiatives only within a subset of all the EU 
members.378 The Eurozone is one such example, as is the Schengen 
visa-free area. The treaty rules require only that, in addition to not 
violating the general principles of the EU, such smaller unions be open 
under equal conditions to other states that might later decide to join.379 
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Conditions for access, such as stringent economic criteria in the case of 
the Eurozone or a reliable immigration enforcement mechanism for the 
Schengen area, are, at least in theory, not discriminatory. Many see 
this variable geometry in Europe, or an EU with different speeds, as 
the necessary future for a continent that grew from its original six to 
its current twenty-eight members, among which there are vast 
differences. Current proposals for reform consider strengthening the 
“core” Eurozone states through the creation of a common parliament, 
a fiscal union, and other such measures of deeper integration.380 EU 
member states that are not in the Eurozone generally oppose this 
model of European integration for fear that it might put them in a 
second-class category.381 Identity is sometimes invoked in these 
debates, with the argument being that the institutional structure 
should reflect the unitary, as opposed to the fragmented, nature of the 
European identity of member states.382 Whatever specific form these 
mini unions might take, they occupy a space in between the nation-
states and the supranational institutions. Identity will play a 
somewhat different, though equally impactful role, in these debates.   
C. Populism 
 Identity federalism seems tailor-made for the age of populism. As 
already seen, the Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian courts rely on that 
concept in order to articulate their opposition to the project of 
European unification. In these jurisdictions, identity has empowered 
autocratic populists to use as they wish the authority that 
constitutional pluralism as a theory of European constitutionalism 
recognizes as theirs.383 While these jurisdictions are notable for their 
radicalism, identity poses a broader and, at times, subtle challenge to 
liberal constitutionalism in the age of populism. The refugee crisis in 
Europe and the immigration debate in the United States have shaped 
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the landscape of contemporary politics.384 From “le grand débat sur 
l’identité nationale” in France to the Muslim ban in the United States, 
and from the British-ness debate in the Brexit context to the search for 
the Dutch or Belgian national identity, the discursive category of 
identity has become central to political discourse.385  
 Central features of identity make it appealing, available, and 
dangerous in this charged political context. As Jan-Werner Muller has 
argued, populism feeds on the problems of political representation to 
moralize a discourse of antipluralism that is quintessentially opposed 
to the values of openness of liberal democracy.386 The leader claims to 
represent the people, identified as unity of purpose and meaning. It is 
easy to see how this particular understanding of the nature of the 
political community can use a conception of identity. As recent political 
experiences from Hungary to Venezuela and from Turkey to the United 
States show, the identitarian discourse enables populist leaders to 
claim access to the essence of a political community and to claim 
legitimacy for political projects that are oftentimes both sectarian and 
divisive. At a time of ever-deeper political polarization, under the 
pressures of an information economy that continues to elude state 
regulation and control, the effect of identity in political discourse can 
be far-reaching.  
 It is still too early to determine the exact scope and depth of the 
challenge that poses to liberal constitutionalism.387 The effects of the 
upheavals that have gripped politics in the United States and have 
added even greater complexity to Europe’s processes of “self-
constituting”388 are still difficult to determine. Identity may outlast 
populism, should the latter start to fade. Or, perhaps a more likely 
alternative, identity might become a mechanism for fragmentation of 
a world that only recently seemed bound towards greater convergence.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 To paraphrase Kafka, identity is a cage in search of a bird.389 
However glitzy or otherwise appealing it might seem at first blush, 
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that cage is still a cage. This Article has pointed to the darker side of 
identity federalism. If recent upheavals in American politics and law 
suggest that some fundamental rearrangements might be in the offing, 
then federalism will be part of any project of rethinking American 
constitutionalism. For all the significant differences between the two 
legal systems, the EU experience serves as a cautionary tale for placing 
federalism under the spell of identity. Resisting such a development, 
while not easy given the politics and culture of our time, might be just 
what fidelity to the values of constitutionalism—in Europe, the United 
States or elsewhere—requires. 
 
